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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1884 there has been great controversy surrounding the issue of civil
recovery for prenatal injuries and fetal wrongful death. In that year Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northhampton' was decided, in which the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held that an unborn infant was a part of its mother, not an
independent entity that could maintain an action for injuries sustained in the

138 Mass. 14 (1884).
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womb.2

This was the first time an American court addressed this issue.
Over the following years courts of other states adopted the Dietrichview
and rejected recovery for prenatal injuries.3 Various reasons were given for
denying recovery, most of which have since been discounted.4 The first was that
the unborn child was seen as a part of the mother, having no independent
existence, so that an injury to the unborn child was actually an injury to the
mother.5 This view has been abandoned in a majority of jurisdictions due to
advances in medical science.6 The second reason was the lack of precedent
allowing recovery.7 However, this reason is no longer valid because the "weight
of authority currently allows a cause of action for the tortious death of a viable
child en ventre sa mere." 8 The third reason traditionally given for denying
recovery for prenatal injures was that the difficulties proving causation would lead
to many fraudulent claims. 9 The final reason was that the issue was one which
should appropriately be decided by the legislature, not the courts.'" Courts often
stated that if the legislature intended to include an unborn child within the
meaning of the applicable wrongful death statute, it could do so explicitly in the
language of the statute."
In 1946, in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 2 an American court departed from Dietrich

2

Id. at 17.

3 See, e.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638 (Ill. 1900); Newman v. City of Detroit, 274

N.W. 710 (Mich. 1937); Buel v. United Ry., 154 S.W. 71 (Mo. 1913); Gorman v. Budlong, 49 A.

704 (R.I. 1901).
4 Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 529 (W. Va. 1995).

5 Id.
6

Id.

7 Id.

Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 530. The term "en ventre sa mere" means "[iin its mother's womb."
534 (6th ed. 1990). "A term descriptive of an unborn child." Id.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

9 Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 529.
'o Id. at 520.
11 d.
12

65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
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for the first time, rejecting the theory that a viable fetus 3 is a part of its mother
and holding that a child could maintain an action for injuries it sustained while
viable in the womb.' 4 Following that decision, courts began rejecting Dietrich
and adopting Bonbrest 5 Today, every jurisdiction in the country permits
recovery for prenatal injuries if the child is born alive.' 6 Furthermore, a majority
of jurisdictions now permit a cause of action to be maintained on behalf of a
viable 7 fetus that is killed in the womb by a tortfeasor's negligence. "8 Four
jurisdictions have gone even further in construing their wrongful death statutes,
holding that a nonviable fetus is a "person," and therefore recovery can be had
for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus en ventre sa mere.' 9
This Note will examine prenatal injury and fetal wrongful death law in
all fifty states and the District of Columbia. In all cases mentioned, a challenge
was brought by the defendant questioning the existence of a cause of action for
prenatal injuries or fetal wrongful death. Each court then decided whether the
word "person" or "minor child," as used in the applicable wrongful death statute,
includes an unborn child.

13 Although the "fetus" is defined as "the unborn offspring in the post embryonic period after major

structures have been outlined (in man from seven to eight weeks after fertilization)," the term is
used throughout this Note to refer to an unborn child at any stage between conception and birth.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 621.
'4

Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 140.

's

Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 528.

16

Id. at 528 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 subsection 1 app. at 79 (1977)).

The term "viable" is used throughout this Note to refer to a fetus that "is sufficiently developed
so as to be capable of life outside the uterus." RANDOM HouSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 1464 (rev.
ed. 1980). It is not used to refer to a specific point of prenatal development because courts and
doctors alike disagree as to at what point in prenatal development a fetus becomes viable.
'7

,F Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 529.
See Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. 1955), Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo.
1995); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996); Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d
522 (W. Va. 1995).
'9
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II. STATES THAT REQUIRE A LIVE BIRTH FOR RECOVERY

A.

Arkansas

In the only on-point case decided in Arkansas, Chatelain v. Kelley,2" the
parents of a stillborn fetus brought a medical malpractice action against the
physicians and hospital for the wrongful death of their full-term, unborn child
caused by a delay in the performance of a Ceasarian section.2 ' The Supreme
Court of Arkansas held that an unborn fetus, viable or not, is not a person within
the context of the Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute, stating that it was the
'
legislature's job to determine the meaning of the word "person."22
B.

California

California courts have been reluctant to expand the definitions of "person"
and "minor person" within the context of its wrongful death statute.23 In Norman

20 910 S.W.2d 215 (Ark. 1995). The Supreme Court of Arkansas was previously presented with

the issue of whether a viable fetus born dead was a "person" within the wrongful death statute, but
it did not reach a decision on the issue because the case was barred by the doctrine of parental
immunity. See Carpenter v. Bishop, 720 S.W.2d 299 (Ark. 1986). However, the court did decide
a similar issue in Carpenterv. Logan, in which it held that there was no basis for the conclusion
that a fetus was a "decedent' in the context of probate. Carpenter v. Logan, 662 S.W.2d 808 (Ark.

1984).
21

Chatelain, 910 S.W.2d at 215.

Id. at 219. The Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute is a survival statute and provides, in part:
(a)(1) Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful
act, neglect, or default and the act, neglect, or default is such as would have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof, if death had not ensued, then,... the person who... would have been
liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1995).
22

California statute currently provides, in part that "[a] cause of action for the death of a person
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another may be asserted by ... the decedent's personal
representative on their behalf .... " CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (Deering Supp. 1996). The
code also provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action for or against
a person is not lost by reason of the person's death, but survives subject to the applicable limitations
period." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.20(a) (Deering Supp. 1996).
2
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v. Murphy24 the parents of a stillborn child brought a wrongful death action for
the death of their nonviable fetus following an automobile accident.25 The
District Court of Appeals for the Third District of California held that an unborn
child is not a "minor person" within the California wrongful death statutes
because "the right of action for wrongful death is unqualifiedly a matter of
statutory provision and is completely within the jurisdiction of the legislature to
grant, to withhold, or to restrict as it sees fit., 26 The court did not discuss the
issue of viability.
In 1972, the Court of Appeals for the First District of California was
faced with a wrongful death claim for the stillbirth of a viable fetus that died as
a result of an automobile accident in Bayer v. Suttle.27 The court held that "the
rationale of [Norman] applies with equal facility to the viable, '2' and "the
legislature did not intend to include an unborn child within the meaning of
'person' in Code of Civil Procedure section 377. "29
Thus, California still requires that a fetus be born alive before allowing
recovery for its wrongful death.
C.

Florida

In 1968, the Supreme Court of Florida was first called upon to decide
whether a stillborn fetus was a "minor child" under the existing law in Stokes v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.3" In Stokes, the fetus was stillborn as a result of
24 268 P.2d 178 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (interpreting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West 1949)

(current version at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (Deering Supp. 1996))).
21

Id. at 179.

26

Id. at 180.

27 100 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (interpreting CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 377 (West 1968)

(current version at CAL. ClV. PROC. CODE
28

§ 377.60 (Deering Supp. 1996))).

Id. at 213.

2 Id. at 215. Similarly, in Justus v. Atchison, the court held that there could be no recovery for
the death of a fetus during delivery because the child was not born alive. Justus v. Atchison, 565
P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977).
o 213 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1968). This case interpreted a Florida statute, which provided, in part that,
"[w]henever the death of a minor child shall be caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness
or default of any individual ... the father of such minor child, or if the father be not living, the
mother may maintain an action against such individual." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.03 (West 1965).
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the negligence of an uninsured motorist.3' The court, emphasized the "peculiar
language of section 768.03, [that allowed] recovery for the wrongful death of a
'minor child,"' and held that a stillborn fetus was not a "minor child" and that a
right of action for wrongful death can only arise after the live birth and
subsequent death of a child.3 2
Following Stokes, Florida's wrongful death statutes were repealed and
replaced.3 3 The first case to interpret the new statute was Davis v. Simpson.34
There, the parents of a stillborn, but otherwise viable fetus, brought a wrongful
death action against physicians, alleging that the physicians' negligence caused
the fetus to be stillborn. 35 The District Court of Appeals of Florida concluded
that:
[w]e must assume that the legislature knew the construction that
had been placed upon the previous death by wrongful act statute
by the Supreme Court in Stokes when it enacted the new statute.
There is no departure in wording of the new statute from that of
the old with relation to 'persons' and 'minor children' which
would indicate an intent to create a new right of action on behalf
of an unborn fetus. Had the legislature intended to make such a
radical change in the law, there is every reason to believe it

The statute has since been amended and renumbered. See infra note 33.
31

Stokes, 213 So. 2d at 696.

2 Id. at 700.
3 Florida's wrongful death statute currently provides:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, default,
or breach of contract or warranty of any person, including those occurring on
navigable waters, and the event would have entitled the person injured to
maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued, the person or
watercraft that would have been liable in damages if death had not ensued shall
be liable for damages as specified in this act.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.19 (West 1986).
" 313 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
35 Id.
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would have done so in clear language. 6
Day v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. is the final significant case in
Florida dealing with prenatal injuries." Day involved an action for prenatal
injuries suffered in an automobile accident by a child who was in the sixth week
of gestation (thus presumably nonviable) and was later born alive.3" The court
held that a child that suffers prenatal injuries at any time after conception may
recover for those injuries if it is born alive.39
D.

Iowa

The issue of recovery for fetal wrongful death was addressed for the first
time by a federal court in Wendt v. Lillo.4 ° The parents of a viable fetus that was
killed in utero as a result of an automobile accident brought a wrongful death
action against the negligent driver.4 ' The district court decided that the applicable
statute' allowed an infant to bring a cause of action for prenatal injuries received
while viable in the womb; therefore, the action survived to the parents of the
43
infant.
In 1971, the Supreme Court of Iowa faced the issue of recovery for fetal

3 Id. at 798. Stokes and Davis have been stubbornly adhered to by the Supreme Court of Florida.
See, e.g., Abdelaziz v. A.M.I.S.U.B. of Florida, Inc., 515 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1987) (denying wrongful
death claim for death of fetus, regardless of viability, because fetus is not a "person" under wrongful
death statute); Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978) (holding that an unborn fetus is not a
"person" within the meaning of the wrongful death statute and holding that a child is not born alive
until it achieves an existence separate and independent from that of mother).

37 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
38

id.

39

Id. at 562.

40 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa, 1960).
41
42

Id.
The Iowa Code provides that "[a]ll causes of action shall survive and may be brought

notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same."
(West 1950).
43

IOWA CODE ANN. § 611.20

Wendt, 182 F. Supp. at 62.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss2/10

8

Washburn Helbling: To Recover Or Not to Recover: A State by State Survey of Fetal Wr
1996]

STATE BY STATE SURVEY

wrongful death for the first time in McKillip v. Zimmerman." The mother of a
stillborn, nonviable fetus that died as a result of an automobile accident brought
5
a wrongful death action against the negligent driver.4 The court held that the
legislature did not intend to include an unborn child when it adopted the survival
statute but intended to include "only those born alive." '46
In 1981, the Supreme Court of Iowa was presented with the same issue
involved in Wendt. The suit was brought by a mother who was improperly
treated for bronchitis and hypertension which caused her nearly full-term fetus to
be stillborn.47 The court upheld McKillip, and decided that a fetus must be born
alive before any action under the survival statute can be maintained because a
fetus, viable or not, is not a "person" within the context of that statute.48
Two years later, in 1983, Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc. was decided. 49 That
case also involved the death of a viable fetus that occurred as a result of an
automobile accident.5 The court quickly dismissed the wrongful death claim
under the survival statute, but then went on to hold that the father could maintain
his action under Rule 8 of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure. 5' The court
distinguished the two rules by saying "[t]he survival statute and rule 8 serve
different functions and compensate different people for different wrongs. Under
section 611.20 the wrong is done to the injured person and to that person's estate.
Under rule 8 the wrong is done to a child's parents. 52
To summarize, Iowa does not allow a wrongful death claim under the
survival statute unless the child is born alive and then dies from its injuries.

14

191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971).

45 Id. at 707.
416Id. at 709. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 611.20 (setting forth the survival statute).
47 Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Iowa 1981).
41 Id. at 270.
49 333 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1983).

'0 Id. at 831.
"' The Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[a] parent, or the parents, may sue for the
expense and actual loss of services, companionship and society resulting from injury to or death of
a minor child." Iowa R. Civ. P. 8
52 Dunn, 333 N.W.2d at 832.
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However, a claim may be brought under Rule 8 of the Iowa Rules of Civil
Procedure to recover expenses and damages resulting from the death of an unborn
child.
E.

Maine

Milton v. Cary Medical Center 13 is the Maine case that deals with fetal
wrongful death. Milton was a wrongful death action brought by a mother against
a hospital and its physicians for causing the death of her viable unborn daughter. 4
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that a viable fetus is not a person as
that term is used in the wrongful death acts, unless born alive."
F.

Nebraska

Nebraska courts first addressed the issue of fetal wrongful death in 1951
in Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co." That case involved a wrongful death action on
behalf of a stillborn fetus that was killed in its eighth month of development as
the result of an explosion caused by a defective oil container.57 The Supreme
Court of Nebraska held that there can be no recovery for a fetus killed in utero,

33 538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988).
54

id.

55 Id. at 253.

The Maine Code provides in part that:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof, then the person.., that would have been liable if death had not
ensued shall be liable for damages.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804(a) (West 1981).

56

50 N.W.2d 229 (Neb. 1951).

5' Id. at 230. The Nebraska Code provides that:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or
default, of any person, company or corporation, and the act, neglect or default
is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every
such case, the person who, or company or corporation which would have been
liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-809 (1996).
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even after the point of viability. 8 Drabbelshas been re-examined several times,
but the Supreme Court of Nebraska stubbornly adheres to its original ruling that
a stillborn fetus is not a "person" for purposes of the wrongful death statute.5 9
New Jersey

G.

There are several cases in New Jersey dealing with the issue of prenatal
injuries. The first, Ryan v. Public Service CoordinatedTransport,was an action
brought by an infant for injuries he sustained while in the womb. 60 The court
held that no cause of action existed for prenatal injuries because an act of the
legislature was necessary to provide for such a cause of action. 6'
In Smith v. Brennan, a case similar to Ryan, an infant brought an action
for prenatal injuries.6 ' The court overruled Ryan and its progeny, stating:
We conclude that the reasons advanced for the decisions denying
recovery to a child who survives a prenatal injury are inadequate.
They deny basic medical knowledge; they ignore the protection
afforded unborn children by other branches of the law, and are
founded upon fears which should not weigh with the courts. We
believe that a surviving child should have a right of action in tort
for prenatal injuries for the plain reason that it would be injust to
deny it. Therefore, the rule of Stemmer v. Kline is no longer the
law of this State.63
The court also added that this decision was applicable regardless of whether the
infant was viable at the time of the injury in the womb.64

5 Drabbels, 50 N.W.2d at 231.
9 See Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 490 (Neb. 1986); see also Egbert
v. Wenzl, 260 N.W.2d 480 (Neb. 1977).
60

14 A.2d 52, 53 (N.J. 1940).

61

Id. at 55. In 1942, Ryan was affirmed in Stemmer v. Kline, 26 A.2d 489 (N.J. 1942).

62

157 A.2d 497, 498 (N.J. 1960).

63

Id. at 503. The rule in Stemmer was that no cause of action existed for prenatal injuries. 26

A.2d 489 (N.J. 1942).
64

id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1996

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 99, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 10
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:363

In 1964, the Supreme Court of New Jersey was confronted with the
stillbirth of a viable fetus following an automobile accident in Grafv. Taggert.5
The parents of the fetus brought a wrongful death action against the negligent
driver.6 6 The court held that there was no right of recovery for the death of a
viable fetus en ventre sa mere. 7 This decision was later ratified by Giardinav.
Bennett.68
New York

H.

New York courts have addressed the issue of prenatal torts numerous
times, beginning with Drobner v. Peters.9 In Drobner,a cause of action was
brought on behalf of an infant who experienced injuries while viable in utero.70
The Court of Appeals of New York denied recovery, ruling that imputing a legal
personality to an unborn child is a "legal fiction or indulgence" and that a
prenatal injury is an injury to the mother, not to the unborn child. 7'

6' 204 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1964).
66

Id. at 141. The New Jersey wrongful death statute provides that:

When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default, such
as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain
an action for damages resulting from the injury, the person who would have
been liable in damages for the injury if death had not ensued shall be liable in
an action for damages.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 (West 1987).
67

Graf 204 A.2d at 146. The court stated:
There are compelling policy reasons, set forth in Smith v. Brennan, for allowing
recovery where a child born alive and suffering from prenatal injuries sues for
damages. In that situation the child bears the mark of defendant's wrong as a
physical or mental deformity which could handicap him for the rest of his life;
and could require him, his parents, or the state to expend considerable sums of
money on his behalf. These reasons do not exist when the child is stillborn.

Id.
60

545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1988).

69

133 N.E. 567 (N.Y. 1921).

70

Id.

71

Id. at 567-68. The court wrote:
The modem tendency of decided cases is to ignore fiction and deal with things
as they are ....
May this court attach an unnatural meaning to simple words
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Drobnerremained the law in New York for thirty years, until Woods v.
Lancet72 was decided in 1951. In Woods, an infant brought an action for injuries
he sustained while viable in his mother's womb.73 The court overruled Drobner,
concluding that "[t]o deny the infant relief in this case is not only a harsh result,
but its effect is to do reverence to an outmoded, timeworn fiction not founded on
fact and within common knowledge untrue and unjustified."7 4
In 1953, the Woods rule was broadened by Kelly v. Gregory.7 5 In Kelly,
the Supreme Court, Appellate Division ruled that if an infant is injured prenatally
and survives birth, the infant may maintain an action for those injuries, regardless
of viability at the time of the injury.76
In 1957, the Court of Appeals decided In re Estate of Logan.77 Logan
involved an application for letters of administration on the estate of a stillborn
fetus on the grounds that a cause of action existed for the wrongful death of a
fetus.7" The court denied the application because it concluded that a right of
action for the wrongful death of a fetus en ventre sa mere did not exist.7 9

and hold independently of statute that a cause of action for prenatal injuries is
reserved to the child until the moment of its birth and then accrues? The
formulation of such a principle of legal liability against precedent and practice
may be a tempting task, to which sympathy and natural justice point the way;
but I cannot bring myself to the conclusion that the plaintiff has a cause of
action at common law. The injuries were, when inflicted, injuries to the
mother.

Id.
72 102 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1951).

73Id.
4 Id. at 695. The court limited its ruling to allow recovery only for infants who were injured after
the point of viability in the womb. Id.
75

See Kelly v. Gregory, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (App. Div. 1953).

76

Id. at 698.

156 N.Y.S.2d 49 (N.Y. 1956). The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a very
brief opinion. In re Logan's Estate, 144 N.E.2d 644 (N.Y. 1957).
77

78 Id.

at 50. Letters of administration are "[f]ormal document[s] issued by probate court appointing
one an administrator of an estate." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 905.
'9In re Estate ofLogan, 156 N.Y.S.2d at 52. If the cause of action does not exist, then "there is
no property warranting administration." Id.
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The issue was next addressed in Endresz v. Friedberg," which involved
a wrongful death action brought for the stillbirth of viable twin fetuses."' The
court, relying on the Logan decision, maintained that a right of recovery for the
wrongful death of a fetus not born alive did not exist.8 2
In short, New York allows recovery for prenatal injuries suffered while
in the womb if the fetus is born alive, regardless of whether the fetus is viable at
the time of the injury. Recovery for the death of a fetus before a live birth has
been denied.
L

Tennessee

Tennessee is one of the few states that adhere to the minority view that
a stillborn viable fetus is not a person and therefore cannot be the object of
recovery for wrongful death. 3 This view requires a live birth before wrongful
death recovery can be had for tortious prenatal injuries. The first time Tennessee

80 Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969).
8I Id. at 902. The New York Code provides, in part, that:

1. The personal representative, duly appointed in this state or any other
jurisdiction, of a decedent who is survived by distributees may maintain an
action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default which caused
the decedent's death against a person who would have been liable to the
decedent by reason of such wrongful conduct if death had not ensued.
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney's 1981 Supp. 1996).
82

Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 901. The court stated:
It is argued that it is arbitrary and illogical to draw the line at birth, with the
result that the distributees of an injured foetus which survives birth by a few
minutes may have recovery while those of a stillborn foetus may not. However,
such difficulties are always present where a line must be drawn. To make
viability rather than birth the test would not remove the difficulty, but merely
relocate it and increase a hundredfold the problems of causation and damages.

Id. This decision was reaffirmed in Ryan v. Beth IsraelHosp., 409 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1978).
83

The Tennessee Code provides, in part, that:

The right of action which a person, who dies from injuries received from
another, or whose death is caused by the wrongful act, omission, or killing by
another, would have had against the wrongdoer, in case death had not ensued,
shall not abate or be extinguished by the person's death but shall pass to [the
personal representative of the decedent].
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106(a) (1994).
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articulated this opinion was in 1958 in Hogan v. McDaniel.84 That case was an
action by the parents of an unborn child to recover for its death in the womb after
nine-and-one-half months of prenatal development." The court found decisions
in other jurisdictions holding that there can be no recovery for the death of a
viable fetus en ventre sa mere to be most persuasive.86 That decision has been
challenged, but the Supreme Court of Tennessee has steadfastly declined to
overrule it, even though the overwhelming majority of states have renounced the
rule as unjust and illogical.8
In 1962, the Supreme Court of Tennessee was asked to decide if a
wrongful death action could be maintained for the death of an infant injured while
viable in the womb.88 The court held that the triplet infants would have been able
to maintain actions for their prenatal injuries had they lived; therefore, when the
children died from those injuries, their right of action survived in the parents.89
.

Texas

In Texas, the adjudication of the controversial issue of recovery for
prenatal injuries began in 1935 in the case of Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co.
v. Jordan.9" In Jordan the court held that, for reasons of "lack of authority;
practical inconvenience and possible injustice; no separate entity apart from the

m 419 S.W.2d 221 (Tenn. 1958) (interpreting TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-607 (1953) (current version
at TENN. CODE ANN § 20-5-106 (1994))).
"' Id. at 221-22.
86

Id. at 224. The court stated:
The cases relied on by plaintiffs' counsel and which follow the [at that time]
minority rule, are based upon the notable advance in medical science and the
biological fact that life begins at the moment of conception, and that it is such
a vital organism as to be at once a person is esse. This is a pure fiction of the
law.

Id.
See Hamby v. McDaniel, 559 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1977); see also Durrett v. Owens, 371 S.W.2d
433 (Tenn. 1963).
'7

' Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv., Inc., 358 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1962) (interpreting TENN.
CODE ANN. § 20-607 (1959) (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1994))).
89 Id. at 476.

90 78 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1935).
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mother, and therefore no duty of care; no person or human being in esse at the
time of the accident," recovery for the death of an infant due to prenatal injuries
would be denied, despite a live birth. 9'
This remained the law in Texas for forty-two years, until the Supreme
Court of Texas decided Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc.92 In that case, the
parents of an infant girl who had sustained injuries in her sixth month of prenatal
development, and who died two days after birth, challenged the Jordan decision
that no cause of action existed in such cases. 93 The court expressly overruled
Jordan,94 holding that a right of action for prenatal injuries sustained by an infant
while viable in the womb was recognized in Texas, as was an action for the death
of such a child after birth. 95
In 1971, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals addressed the issue of whether
an infant who sustains injuries while not viable in the womb can maintain an
action for those injuries after birth. 96 The court held that a cause of action exists
for prenatal injuries sustained any time during prenatal development only when
the child is born alive and survives. 9'
The final significant case in Texas was Witty v. American General Capital
Distributors,Inc.,98 decided by the Supreme Court of Texas in 1987. There, the
mother of a viable fetus that died in the womb brought wrongful death and
survival actions. 99 As to the wrongful death action, the court held that no cause

" Id. at 947 (quoting Drobner v. Peters, 133 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1921)). The Texas Code provided,
"The preceding article [4671] must be of such character as would, if death had not ensued, have
entitled the party to maintain an action for such injury." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. tit. 77 art.
4672 (West 1921) (current version at TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002 (West 1986)).
92 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967).
9'

Id. at 821.

94

Id. at 822.

95 Id.

96 See Yandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
9' Id.

at 570.

727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987).
Id. at 504. The Texas Code provides, in part, that "[a] person is liable for damages arising from
an injury that causes an individual's death if the injury was caused by the person's ... wrongful
act, neglect, carelessness, unskillfulness, or default." TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001
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of action exists for the death of a child due to prenatal injuries unless it is born
alive.'
The court came to the same conclusion with regard to the survival
statute."'0
K

Utah

In Utah there is only one important on-point case. In that case, Webb v.
Snow,' the mother of a viable but stillborn fetus brought a wrongful death action
alleging negligent obstetric care."0 3 The court held that "[w]hile injuries resulting
in a miscarriage are actionable, and compensation may be awarded for the
physical and mental sufferings experienced by a woman who has a miscarriage
by reason of injuries caused by the wrongful acts of others, damages are not
awarded for 'loss of the unborn child' itself."'0 4 Accordingly, a wrongful death
action may not be maintained for the death of a viable fetus in utero.

(West 1986).
to Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 504. The court stated:
[w]e have found no evidence that the legislature intended to include a fetus
within the scope of our wrongful death statute. Therefore, no cause of action
may be maintained for the death of a fetus under the wrongful death statute
until the right to bring such action is afforded by the legislature.

Id. at 506.
'oRId. at 506. This decision has been challenged and reaffirmed several times. See Krishnan V.
Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1995); see also Edinburg Hosp. Auth. v. Trevino, 904 S.W.2d
831 (Tex. 1995); Blackman v. Langford, 795 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1990); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist.
v. Lobdell, 726 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. 1987).
I02 132 P.2d 114 (Utah 1942).
(0

Id. at 115. The Idaho Code currently provides, in part, that "[e]xcept as provided in Title 35,

Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation, a parent or guardian may maintain an action for the death or
injury of a minor child when such injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-6 (1992).
104 Webb, 132 P.2d at 119. That decision was affirmed in 1975 in the case of Nelson v. Peterson,

which also involved the death of an unborn viable child. 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975). The Supreme
Court of Utah took only two brief paragraphs to address the issue, holding that the action was
without merit and that the mother could recover for injuries to herself due to the miscarriage, but
not for the death of the fetus itself. Id. at 1077.
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Virginia

L.

The courts of Virginia addressed the issue of prenatal injuries for the first
time in 1969 in Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co."0 5 In that case, the father of a
stillborn viable fetus sought damages for its death under the wrongful death
statute."c6 The court concluded that "the proposition that a viable fetus is a person
is a highly theoretical and fictional concept, and to say that such a 'person' could
have maintained an action if death had not ensued is to carry the fiction even
further. This [the court is] unwilling to do.' ' 7
The only other case addressing the issue of prenatal injuries in Virginia
is Kalafit v. Gruver,'° decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia in 1990. That
case was a wrongful death action brought on behalf of a child that was prenatally
injured and died only a few hours after a prematur6 birth." 9 The court held:
[W]e adopt the following principle in this case, paraphrasing the
Restatement rule: A tortfeasor who causes harm to an unborn
child is subject to liability to the child, or to the child's estate,
for the harm to the child, if the child is bom alive. [citations
omitted] We do not limit the application of this rule to unborn
children who are viable at the time of the tortious act. Thus, an
action may be maintained for recovery of damages for any injury

105169 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1969).
i16

Id. at 440. Virginia's statutory scheme provided in pertinent part that:

Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect,
or default of any person or corporation, . . . and the act, neglect, or default is
such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action ....and to recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in
every such case, the person who, or corporation ...which, would have been
liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-633 (1958) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 (Michie 1992)).
"07Lawrence, 169 S.E.2d at 442. In 1986, the Supreme Court of Virginia allowed an action to
recover damages for the death of an unborn child, stating that in Lawrence the court adopted the
view that the fetus is a part of the mother until birth and therefore an injury to the fetus is an injury
to the mother. See Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233 (Va. 1986). The court limited damages to
physical and mental damages suffered by the mother as the result of the stillbirth, not permitting
recovery for loss of the child's society, companionship, comfort, or guidance. Id. at 237.
'o0 389 S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1990) (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 (Michie 1992)).
109 Id.
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occurring after conception, provided the tortious conduct and the
proximate cause of the harm can be established."'
III. STATES THAT ALLOW RECOVERY FOR THE
DEATH OF A VIABLE FETUS NOT BORN ALIVE

A.

Alabama

The courts of Alabama have played an active role in defining the words
"minor child" in the Alabama wrongful death statute."' In 1926, in Stanford v.
St. Louis-San FranciscoRailway. Co.," 2 the Supreme Court of Alabama held that
a cause of action did not exist for prenatal injuries because the child was a part
of the mother."' Accordingly, the personal representative of a fetal child injured

in utero, but subsequently bom alive, had no right to proceed with a wrongful
death action if the child later died from its prenatal injuries.
This remained the law in Alabama until 1972, when the Supreme Court
of Alabama decided Huskey v. Smith."' Huskey involved a wrongful death action
on behalf of an infant who was injured while viable in the womb and who died
two days after birth from injuries sustained in an automobile accident occurring
just before parturition." 5 The court expressly overruled Stanford and held that
a parent or legal representative had "the right to proceed in a wrongful death
action where (a) the fetal child was viable at the time of the injury; and (b) the

Io Id. at 683-84.

The Wrongful Death Act provides, in part:
When the death of a minor child is caused by the wrongful act, omission, or
negligence of any person, or corporation, or the servants or agents of either, the
father, or the mother as specified in Section 6-5-390, or, if the father and
mother are both dead or if they decline to commence the action, or fail to do
so within six months from the death of the minor, the personal representative
of the minor may commence an action.
ALA. CODE § 6-5-391(a) (Supp. 1996).
"

112

Stanford v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 108 So. 566 (Ala. 1926).

",

Id. at 567.

114

265 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1972).

"' Id. at 596.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1996

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 99, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 10
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:363

child is born alive."'"1 6
In Wolfe v. Isbell,"7 the plaintiff brought an action, alleging that his
daughter's death minutes after birth was the result of an automobile accident that
occurred prior to viability in utero."8 The court held that an action can be
maintained for the wrongful death of an unborn child as the result of prenatal
injuries, whether or not the child was viable at the time of the injury, if the child
is subsequently born alive and dies from the injury." 9
In Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores,20 the Supreme Court of Alabama decided
that live birth was not a prerequisite to liability for wrongful death.' 2 ' The Eich
court did not expressly discuss viability, and the scope of the opinion was unclear.
The court seemed as if it would allow recovery for the death of an unborn child
22
at any stage, whether viable or not.'
However, any speculation on this issue was dispelled when two decisions
were handed down that denied recovery for the wrongful death of a nonviable
fetus en ventre sa mere. 123 In both cases, the court stated that a nonviable fetus
is not a "minor child" within the meaning of the wrongful death statute. 24 The
court based its decisions on two factors: the lack of authority from other
116

Id. at 597.

"7

280 So. 2d 758 (Ala. 1973) (interpreting ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 119 (1940) (current version at
§ 6-5-391 (Supp. 1996))).

ALA. CODE

"" Wolfe, 280 So. 2d at 759.

"19 Id.at 763.
'2'

300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974) (interpreting ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 119 (1940) (current version at

ALA. CODE § 6-5-391 (Supp. 1996))).
121 Eich, 300

So. 2d at 358.

122 Id. at 358. The court made broad, vague statements such as: "[O]nce we accept the basic
premise that a fetus is a potential human life at the time of the injury, we feel that the substantive
rights resulting from wrongful death must be protected .... " Id.

" See Lollar v. Tankersley, 613 So. 2d 1249 (Ala. 1993); Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241
(Ala. 1993). Both cases were actions against physicians for negligently performing a dilatation and
curettage ("D & C"). A dilatation and curettage is a medical procedure which is performed for the
purpose of removing placenta and fetal tissue from the uterus.
24 Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1241; see also Lollar, 613 So. 2d at 1249. Both cases were interpreting

section 6-5-391 of the Alabama Code. Id.; Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1241; see ALA. CODE § 6-5-391
(1993) (previously codified at ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 119 (1940)).
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jurisdictions which would allow recovery for the wrongful death of a nonviable
fetus en ventre sa mere and
the lack of legislative intent to include nonviable
25
fetuses within the statute.
In sum, Alabama allows recovery for both the death after a live birth,
regardless of when the injury was inflicted, and for the death of a viable fetus en
ventre sa mere. The Supreme Court of Alabama has denied recovery for the
stillbirth of a nonviable fetus.
B.

Alaska

Alaska's state courts have never considered whether recovery for fetal
wrongful death is available, but the United States District Court of Alaska
addressed the issue in Mace v. Jung. 26 In Mace, the Administratrix of the Estate
of Baby Mace brought a wrongful death action on behalf of the stillborn fetus
who died as 2the
result of an automobile accident which occurred before the fetus
7
was viable.
The court noted the lack of precedent in Alaska and then determined that
the trend in other jurisdictions was to allow actions where the child was viable
at the time of the injury and born dead"2 ' and where the child was viable, born
alive, and then died as a result of the injuries.'29 Based on these decisions, the
court held that "recovery could not be had under Alaska's wrongful death statute
for the death of a nonviable unborn child."'30

325

Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1244. See also Lollar, 613 So. 2d at 1252.

210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962) (interpreting ALASKA STAT. § 61-7-3 (1949) (current version
at ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (1994))).
12

127 Id.

at 706.

" Id. (citing Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (Iowa 1960); Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan.
1962); Verkennes v. Comiea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949)).
329

Id. (citing Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412 (Ill.
1953); Keyes v. Construction Serv., 165

N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1960)).
3

Id.

The Alaska Wrongful Death Act is a survival statute and states, in part:

Except as provided under (f) of this section, when the death of a person is
caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representatives
of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former
might have maintained an action, had the person lived, against the latter for an
injury done by the same act or omission.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580(a) (1994).
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Arizona

Whether a fetus was a "person" within the Arizona's wrongful death
statute was first decided in 1974 in Kilmer v. Hicks.' 3' In that case, Evelyn
Kilmer was killed in an automobile accident while two days overdue in her
pregnancy. Her viable fetus died in utero as a result of the accident.1'3
The
Arizona Court of Appeals held that "the meaning of the word 'person' in the
statute is clear and unambiguous in its non-inclusion of a viable fetus. It is a
matter of the legislature to expand the statutory definition if it deems appropriate
' 33
and not a matter for this court."'
In 1985, the Supreme Court of Arizona reversed Hicks when it decided
Summerfield v. Superior Court.3 4 In Summerfield, the parents of a viable fetus
that was stillborn as a result of alleged medical malpractice brought a wrongful
death action against the physicians. 35 The court took the opportunity to
disapprove of Hicks, and holding that "absent a clear and definitive demonstration
of legislative intent to the contrary, the word 'person' in the wrongful death
37
statutes13 6 encompasses a stillborn, viable fetus.',

"' 529 P.2d 706 (Ariz. 1974). The issue was first raised in 1966 but was not decided at that time
because the case was dismissed for unrelated reasons. See Larriva v. Widmer, 415 P.2d 424 (Ariz.
1966). The Arizona Wrongful Death Act provides:
When death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the
act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages in respect thereof,
then, and in every such case, the person who or the corporation which would
have been liable had death not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages.
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-611 (1992).
132 Kilmer, 529 P.2d at 706.

"' Id. at 708.
114

698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985).

135 id.
136

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-611 et. seq. (1992).

Summerfield, 698 P.2d at 724. The court based its decision on the fact that the fetus would
have been able to maintain an action had it lived and on the legislative objective of providing
protection for the fetus. Id. at 720-21.
117
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Colorado

Colorado state courts have never addressed a case involving prenatal
injuries resulting in death. However, the United States District Court of Colorado
interpreted the word "person" in Colorado's wrongful death statute in Espadero
v. Feld.'3 8 There, Alejandra Pieroni, who was nine months pregnant, was killed
in an automobile accident along with her full-term unborn son.' 39 The court held
that "a wrongful death action may be maintained under
Colorado law for the
140
fetus.'
full-term
a
particularly
fetus,
death of a viable
E.

Connecticut

The first time Connecticut courts interpreted the meaning of the
Connecticut wrongful death statute' 4' regarding fetal injuries was in Tursi v. New
England Windsor Co.'42 In that case a child who was injured prenatally brought

649 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Colo. 1986). The Colorado statute is a survival statute and provides:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default of
another, and the act, neglect, and default is such as would, if death had not
ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who or the
corporation which would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be
liable in an action for damages.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-202 (West 1987).
'3

139

Espadero, 649 F. Supp. at 1481. In Espadero,the plaintiffs alleged that Jerry Feld negligently

served intoxicating beverages to a customer, which caused the customer to strike the automobile
which Luis Espadero was driving. Id. Alejandra Pieroni was a passenger in Espadero's vehicle.

Id.
'40 Id. at 1484.
The Connecticut Code provides:
In any action surviving to or brought by an executor or administrator for
injuries resulting in death, whether instantaneous or otherwise, such executor or
administrator may recover from the party legally at fault for such injuries just
damages together with the cost of reasonably necessary medical, hospital and
nursing services, and including funeral expenses.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555 (West 1991) (previously codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
2428 (West 1953)).
141

142 111 A.2d 14 (Conn. Super. Ct.

1955).
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a negligence action for the injuries sustained. 4 3 The Superior Court held that
"[w]here a viable fetus is injured en ventre sa mere through negligence of the
defendants, he has, when born, a cause of action against them.""'
Another significant case was Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.'45 In
Prates, an action was brought for the death of a child, five days after her live
birth, caused by personal injuries received while viable in the womb.4 6 The
Superior Court held that, because, under Tursi, the decedent would have had a
right of action had she lived, the action survived her and could be brought by her
administrator.'47
In 1962, the Superior Court addressed a similar issue involving the
stillbirth of a viable fetus as the result of an automobile accident in Gorke v.
LeClerke.4 ' The court held that a wrongful
death action could be maintained for
149
womb.
the
in
fetus
viable
a
of
the death
One final significant case in Connecticut is Simon v. Mullin. 5 In that
case, a nonviable fetus was injured en ventre sa mere, was born alive, and died
from its injuries.'' The court held that a child born alive who subsequently dies
can recover for prenatal injuries inflicted at any time after conception, without
52
regard to viability.

143

Id.

144 Id. at

16.

118 A.2d 633 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1955) (interpreting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2428 (West
1953) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555 (West 1991))).
'41

146

Id. at 633.

147

Id. at 635.

141 181 A.2d 448, 449 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1962) (interpreting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555
(West 1991) (previously codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2428 (West 1953))).

149Id.at 451.

380 A.2d 1353 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977) (interpreting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555 (West
1991) (previously codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2428 (West 1953))).
'0

' Id. at 1354.
112

Id. at 1357.
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F.

Delaware

In the only notable Delaware case on the issue, Worgan v. Greggo &
53 the administrator of the estate of a stillborn viable fetus killed by
Ferrara,'
negligence brought a wrongful death action against the defendants. 5 4 The
Superior Court of Delaware, held that a right of action did exist for the wrongful
death of a viable fetus.' The scope of this decision is not clear, but most courts
have interpreted the opinion to hold that a cause of action exists for the death of
a viable fetus, whether or not it is born alive.' 56
G.

Districtof Columbia

One of the most important cases in the area of fetal wrongful death law
was decided by the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia in 1946.
That case, Bonbrest v. Kotz, 57 was the first to recognize a cause of action for
prenatal injury.'58 In Bonbrest, a father sued on behalf of his child for injuries
sustained during delivery. 5 9 The court held that an infant who is viable at the
time of the injury may maintain an action for prenatal injuries if it is subsequently
now allows a cause of
born alive. 60 Following this decision, every jurisdiction
61
action for prenatal injuries if the child is born alive.'
In 1971, Simmons v. Howard University 6 was decided by the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. In Simmons, a father brought
-

113

128 A.2d 557 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956).

154

Id.

155 Id.
156

'
I51

See, e.g., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 721 n.5 (Ariz. 1985).
65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).

See id. at 139.

159Id.
160 Id. at 142.

Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: JurisprudentialInconsistencies in Wrongful
Death, Criminal Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 933, 935 (1995).
161

162 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971).
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a wrongful death action after his wife died during delivery and the defendant
negligently failed to deliver his child alive. 63 The court concluded that "a viable
unborn child, which would have been born alive but for the negligence of the
defendant, is a 'person' 64 as that term is used in the District of Columbia
Wrongful Death Statute.
In 1983, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided
GreaterSoutheast Community Hospital v. Williams.6 In Williams, the plaintiff
brought a wrongful death action against a hospital and a physician for negligent
treatment that resulted in the stillbirth of her fetus in the thirty-third week of
gestation.'" The court first adopted the Bonbrest rule and held that a child born
alive can recover for prenatal injuries.6 7 The court, holding that fatal prenatal
injury to a viable fetus is actionable, stated that:
[i]f a viable fetus is a "person injured" at the time of the injury,
then perforce the fetus is a "person" when he dies of those
injuries, and it can make no difference in liability under the
wrongful death and survival statutes whether the fetus dies of the
68
injuries just prior to or just after birth.
H.

Hawaii

Hawaii's state courts have never addressed the issue of fetal wrongful
death. However, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii did
have the opportunity to interpret the state's wrongful death statute as it relates to
163

Id.

164

Id. The District of Columbia Code provides, in pertinent part:

When, by an injury done or happening within the limits of the District, the
death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of a person
or corporation, and the act, neglect, or default is such as will, if death does not
ensue, entitle the person injured, . . . to maintain an action and recover
damages, the person who or corporation that is liable if death does not ensue is
liable to an action for damages for the death.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2701 (Michie 1981).
165

482 A.2d 394 (D.C. 1984).

166

Id. at 395.

167

Id. at 396.

168

Id. at 397.
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prenatal injuries in Wade v. United States.169 In Wade, the parents of stillborn
twin fetuses injured in their twenty-second week brought an action against the
government for the malpractice of Army hospital physicians.170 The court
concluded that the Supreme Court of Hawaii would be most likely to adopt the
majority view that allows a cause of action for the wrongful death of a viable, but
not a nonviable, fetus because it is the "more logical and thoughtful holding."''
I.

Idaho

In Idaho, there are two cases in the area of recovery for prenatal injuries.
The first, Volk v. Baldazo,"' was decided by the Supreme Court of Idaho in
1982. Volk involved an action brought by a mother whose viable, unborn child
was stillborn as a result of a car accident.17 ' The mother claimed that a viable,
unborn fetus is a "person" under section 5-311 of the Idaho Code va and a "child"
as used in section 5-310 of the Idaho Code. 175 The court, noting that this was a
matter of first impression, took the "unique opportunity to clarify the law of
Idaho as it pertains to the narrow area presented by these unusual
circumstances.' 76

169745 F. Supp. 1573 (D. Haw. 1990). The Hawaii Code provides, in part, "[w]hen the death of
a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of any person, the deceased's legal
representative, or any of the persons hereinafter enumerated, may maintain an action against the
person causing the death or against the person responsible for the death." HAW. REv. STAT. § 663-3
(1993).
170

Wade, 745 F. Supp. at 1575.

'71

Id. at 1579.

172

651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982).

t'

Id. at 12.

The Idaho Code provided, in part, that "[w]hen the death of a person, not being a person
provided for in section 5-310, Idaho Code, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his
heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for damages against the person causing
death." IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1972).
174

"3 The Idaho Code provided, in part, "[t]he parents may maintain an action for the injury or death
of an unmarried minor child ... when such injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect
of another." IDAHO CODE § 5-310 (1972).
176

Volk, 651 P.2d at 13.
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The court first concluded that a cause of action exists on behalf of a child
who sustains prenatal injuries while viable in the womb and is subsequently born
alive.'7 7 Accordingly, had the Volk child lived, it would have been able to
maintain a cause of action for its injuries.' 78 The court limited this holding to
circumstances in which the fetus was viable at the time of the injury, but did not
necessarily preclude liability for injuries to a nonviable fetus that was later born
alive. 7 9 The court then held that the term "minor child" in section 5-310 of the
Idaho Code marked the upper age limit beyond which a parent may not bring a
cause of action, not a lower age limit.'
Therefore, the term "minor child"
encompassed a viable, unborn fetus and a wrongful death action could be
8
maintained for its death.1 '
Although the Volk court did not make any decisions regarding the injury
or death of a nonviable fetus, the United States District Court for the District of
Idaho was forced to decide the issue in Santana v. Zilog, Inc.' 82 Santana
involved a woman who alleged that exposure to harmful chemicals caused her to
suffer six miscarriages, all prior to viability. 8 3 The court refused to extend the
law to encompass the death of a nonviable fetus, saying:
[B]ased on the better-reasoned view of the majority of
jurisdictions, I hold that under Idaho Code § 5-311, viability
marks the beginning of legal personhood, and the right to assert
a cause of action for the wrongful death of fetus is
correspondingly limited to cases involving the death of a viable

177

Id. at 13.

178

Id. at 14.

179 Id.

180

Id.

18' Volk, 651 P.2d at 15.

878 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Idaho 1995). Two years after Volk, in 1984, the Idaho legislature
amended sections 5-310 and 5-311 of the Idaho Code by removing all references to death in section
5-310 and removing references to section 5-310 contained in section 5-311. Hence, the Idaho Code
now provides, in pertinent part, "When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain an
action for damages against the person causing the death .... " IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1990).
182

183

Santana, 878 F. Supp. at 1375.
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fetus.

8 4

Illinois

J.

The Supreme Court of Illinois first faced the issue of prenatal torts in
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.'85 In that case, a minor child brought a cause of
action for prenatal injuries he received as the result of the negligent operation of
an elevator.8 6 The court held that no cause of action existed for injuries received
the unborn child did not have an existence independent from
before birth because 87
that of the mother.
Allaire remained the law in Illinois until 1953, when Amann v. Faidy'88
was decided. In Amann, the personal representative of a child brought an action
for the death of a child injured while viable en ventre sa mere and subsequently
born alive.'89 The Supreme Court of Illinois, noting that since Allaire, numerous
states had found prenatal injuries actionable, overturned Allaire and held that:
we conclude that the reasons which have been advanced in
support of the doctrine of nonliability fail to carry conviction.
We hold, therefore, in conformity with the recent decisions of the
courts of last resort of [various other states] that plaintiff, as
administratrix of the estate of a viable child, who suffered
prenatal injuries and was thereafter born alive, has a right of

,84 Id. at 1382.

1 56 N.E. 638 (111.1900).
116

Id. at 638.

'

Id. at 640.

188 114 N.E.2d 412 (111.1953).
Id. at 413. The Illinois Code provides, in part:
§ 1. Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect
or default, and the act ... is such as would, if death had not ensued, have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof, then... the person who or company or corporation which would have
been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 740, para. 180/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (previously codified at ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 70 para. I (Smith-Hurd 1951)).
"9
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action against the defendant." 0
The next important case was Daley v. Meier,19' decided in 1961. In that
case, the guardian of a minor brought an action for prenatal injuries received
when he was not viable. 92 The court held that an infant, born alive, can recover
received in the womb regardless of viability at the time of the
for injuries
93
injuries.
In 1969, Rapp v. Hiemenz was decided.' 94 There, the mother of an
unborn child brought a cause of action for the stillbirth of her child which
occurred prior to viability. 95 The court held that no wrongful death action exists
where the injury took place before viability and where the child was not born
alive.' 96

The last notable case in the area of fetal wrongful death in Illinois is

'90

Amann, 114 N.E.2d at 417.

'9' 178 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1961).
192 Id.
193

at 692.

Id. at 694. Interestingly, in 1976, a case was decided based on Daley in which a mother

brought an action for injuries to her child that resulted from alleged medical malpractice that
occurred eight years prior to her daughter's conception. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 351 N.E.2d
870 (I11.App. Ct. 1976). When the mother was thirteen years old, she was negligently given A-RH
negative blood during a blood transfusion. Id. at 871. Her blood type was A-RH positive. Id.
This caused her child born eight years later to have permanent damage to her nervous system and
brain. Id. The court held in part that
the case law in Illinois has established that a minor may recover for prenatal
personal injuries sustained by him if he is born alive. That is alleged to have
happened here. We find no logical reason to deny recovery to a person simply
because he had not yet been conceived when the wrongful conduct took place.
Id. at 874.
'9 246 N.E.2d 77 (III. App. Ct. 1969), aff'd, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (111.1977) (interpreting ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 70, para. 1 (Smith-Hurd 1971) (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 740, para. 180/1

(Smith-Hurd 1993))).
'9' Id. at 78.

" Id. at 80. Rapp was supported by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Green v. Smith where the
court held that viability should remain the line of demarcation in cases of a fetus' death en ventre
sa mere and that if the fetus was not viable, no cause of action existed. Green v. Smith, 377 N.E.2d
37 (I11.1978).
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9 7 In that case, a mother brought a cause of
Chrisafogeorgisv. Brandenberg.'
action for the stillbirth of her viable child caused by an automobile accident. 98
The court held that "[w]eighing the holdings for and against giving a right of
action and their supporting grounds we are persuaded that the preferred rule is
that a right of action [for the death of a viable fetus en ventre sa mere] should be
recognized."' 9 9
In summary, Illinois allows a cause of action for prenatal injuries if the
child is subsequently born alive regardless of viability at the time of the injury
and for the stillbirth of a viable fetus. A cause of action for the death of a
nonviable fetus en ventre sa mere has been rejected.

K

Indiana

The only notable case in Indiana on the subject of prenatal torts was Britt
v. Sears,0 0 where a father brought a wrongful death action for the stillbirth of his
son.2O' The court concluded that "a full-term healthy male capable of independent
life with which its mother, at the time of the death in her womb was then nine
months and one week pregnant, is a 'child' within the meaning of [the wrongful
death statute]." 20 2 Accordingly, a wrongful death action can be maintained for the
death of a viable fetus en ventre sa mere.
L.

Kansas
Kansas courts have decided only two cases involving fetal wrongful

304 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. 1973) (interpreting ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. I (Smith-Hurd 1971)
(current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 740, par. 180/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993))).
'9

'"

Id. at 88-89.

'9'

Id. at 91.

200 277 N.E.2d 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971).
201

Id. at 21.

202

Id. at 27. The Indiana Code provided that "[a] father ... may maintain an action for the..

. death of a child." IND. CODE § 34-1-1-8 (1971).
The Indiana Code now provides, in pertinent part, that "[ain action may be maintained under this
section against the person whose wrongful act or omission caused the injury or death of the child."
IND. CODE § 34-1-1-8(b) (Supp. 1996).
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death. The first was Hale v. Manion.2 °3 In that case, the Hales brought a
wrongful death action for the death of their viable unborn child following an
automobile accident. 04 The Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that, because
an action could be maintained by a child after birth for injuries it received in
utero, the parents had the right to bring an action on its behalf for its death.2" 5
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Kansas decided Humes v. Clinton.20 6 In
that case, the parents of a stillborn, nonviable fetus brought a wrongful death
action against a doctor and a manufacturer of an intrauterine device. 2 7 The court
found "viability an appropriate condition precedent to liability for wrongful death"
and held that "an unborn, nonviable fetus is not a 'person' within the definition
of the wrongful death act and is incapable of bringing an action op its own
behalf."' '
M

Kentucky

There is only one case decided in Kentucky involving recovery for fetal
wrongful death and prenatal injuries.20 9 In Mitchell v. Couch.' 0 the father of a
stillborn viable fetus brought a wrongful death action against the negligent driver
that caused the death of the child and its mother. 2 ' The court concluded that a

203

368 P.2d I (Kan. 1962).

204

Id.

m Id. at 3. The Kansas Code provides that "[i]f the death of a person is caused by the wrongful
act or omission of another, an action may be maintained for the damages resulting therefrom if the
former might have maintained the action had he or she lived . . . against the wrongdoer." KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1901 (1994) (previously codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3203 (1961)).
206

792 P.2d 1032 (Kan. 1990) (interpreting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1901 (1994)).

207 Id.at 1033.
208

Id.at 1037.

In 1969, Orange v. State FarmAutomobile Insurance Co. was decided in which the court held
that a viable unborn child was a legal person with a separate existence of its own and was therefore
a member of the "family" or "household" class that was excluded from coverage in an insurance
policy. 443 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969).
210

285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955).

2,,

Id. at 903.
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right of recovery existed for the stillbirth of a viable
N.

212

fetus.

Louisiana

The first case to be decided in Louisiana on the issue of recovery for
prenatal torts was Cooper v. Blanck.213 In Cooper, a mother brought a cause of
action for the wrongful death of her child occurring several days after birth as the
result of prenatal injuries.214 The Court of Appeals of Louisiana held that an
action may be maintained for the wrongful death of a child injured prenatally and
born alive.21
In 1980, three cases decided by Courts of Appeals established that a cause
of action existed for the stillbirth of a child due to injuries tortiously inflicted
while in the womb.2" 6 The next year, the issue came before the Supreme Court
2" 7 The court first held that there could be no
of Louisiana in Danos v. St. Pierre.

212

Id. at 906.

213 39 So. 2d 352 (La. 1923).
214

Id. at 353. Louisiana statute provides:
Every act whatever of man that causes damages to another obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it. Damages may include loss of consortium,
service, and society, and shall be recoverable by the same with respective
categories of persons who would have had a cause of action for wrongful death
of an injured person.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1979 & Supp. 1996).
235

Cooper, 39 So. 2d at 360. Justice Westerfield was particularly eloquent in this opinion, stating:
The maternal instinct is one of the great elemental passions of life. Its
gratification often marks the difference between a happy, peaceful and
contended existence and a leaden footed march through life's pathway, far
sweeter than the music of the spheres, or the soft cadences of 'An Aeolian Harp
when swept by the fingers of the night wind' to the mother's ears are the first
plaintive notes of the 'heir of all the ages.'

Id.
236See Diefenderfer v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 383 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1980); Wascom

v. American Indem. Corp., 383 So. 2d 1037 (La. 1980); Deason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
386 So. 2d 146 (La. 1980).
217

402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981).
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recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus."' However, on rehearing the
court reversed and held that "the arguments favoring recovery more fully satisfy
logical reasoning and application of the natural law" and that parents could
recover wrongful death damages for the stillbirth of their child.2 9
0.

Maryland

There are several Maryland cases involving the question of recovery for
prenatal injuries. The first is Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch,2. decided by the Court
of Appeals of Maryland in 1951. In Damasiewicz, an infant brought a cause of
action for injuries sustained in an automobile accident while he was viable in the
womb.22 ' The court held that an infant injured while viable in the womb has a
cause of action against the responsible party after birth.222
The next significant case, State v. Sherman,223 was a wrongful death
action for the death of a viable fetus in the womb that occurred as the result of
an automobile accident in the ninth month of gestation.2 24 The court held that
"under the plain words of the death statute ... the action survives, or permits the
'
parents to recover, notwithstanding the death of the child."225

21' Id. at 636. The court based its ruling on article 28 of the Louisiana Code, which states that

"[c]hildren born dead are considered as if they had never been born or conceived." LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 28 (West 1979).
219

Danos, 402 So. 2d at 639.

220

79 A.2d 550 (Md. 1951).

" Id. The accident caused the infant to be born prematurely and suffer from loss of sight in both
eyes. Id.
222

Id. at 560.

223

198 A.2d 71 (Md. 1964).

224

Id. at 72.

Id. at 73. The "death statute" mentioned is section I of article 67 of the Maryland Code, which
read, in part:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not
ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof, the ... person who would have been liable had
death not ensued.... shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding
22
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The next case, Group Health Association, Inc. v. Blumenthal, was
decided in 1983.226 That case was a wrongful death action on behalf of a
nonviable vetus that was born prematurely and then died later due to medical
malpractice.227 The court held that when a child is born alive after receiving
prenatal injuries and then dies, a right of action exists regardless of viability at
the time of the injuries.228
The final case in this area is Kandel v. White. z9 Kandel was a wrongful
death action brought on behalf of a nonviable stillborn fetus.23 The court held
that:
to deny a nonviable [stillborn] fetus a cause of action is . . .
simply a policy determination that the law will not extend civil
liability by giving a nonviable fetus a cause of action for
negligence before it becomes a person, in the real and usual sense
of the word, by being born alive.2 '
In summary, Maryland courts have allowed a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a fetus that is born alive, regardless of viability at the time of
the injury, and for the death of a viable fetus en ventre sa mere. However,
Maryland courts have rejected recovery for the death of a nonviable fetus that is
not born alive.

the death of the person injured.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 67, § 1 (1957) (current version at MD. CODE ANN. CTs. & JUD. PROC.
(1995)).
226 453

A.2d 1198 (Md. 1983) (interpreting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.

§ 3-902

§ 3-902 (1995)

(previously codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 67 § 1 (1957))).
227

Id. at 1201.

m Id. at 1206. Specifically, the court stated that "the concept of viability has no role in a case,
such as this, where the child is born alive." Id.

2 663 A.2d 1264 (Md. 1995) (interpreting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-902 (1995)
(previously codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 67 § 1 (1957))).
230

Id. at 1265.

231

Id. at 1270 (quoting Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 136-37 (N.H. 1980)).
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Massachusetts

Dietrich v. Inhabitantsof Northhampton232 was the first decision by an
American court on the issue of prenatal injuries. Dietrich involved an infant that
was injured prenatally, was born prematurely, and died only minutes after its
birth 33 The court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, held that there was no right
of recovery for the death of an infant resulting from a prenatal injury.234
This remained the law in Massachusetts until Keyes v. Construction
Service, Inc.235 was decided in 1960. Keyes involved a wrongful death action on
behalf of an infant that was injured while viable in the womb. The infant was
born prematurely and died shortly after birth. 36 The court held that, due to the
growing body of precedent allowing recovery in such circumstances and the
progress made in medical science since the Dietrich decision, a cause of action
would lie if the child is viable when injured and is subsequently born alive.237
In Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 8 a mother brought a wrongful death
action on behalf of her child who was injured before viability, was born alive,
and who died two and one-half hours later3 9 The court held that an action could
be maintained on behalf of a child who was injured while not viable but who was
subsequently born alive. 4°

232

138 Mass. 14 (1884).

233 Id. at 15.
234 Id. at 17.
235

165 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1960).

236

Id. at 913.

237 Id. at 915.
238 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967).
239

Id.

24' Id. at 927. The Massachusetts statute provides, in part:
A person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a person, or (2) by
willful, wanton or reckless act causes the death of a person under such
circumstances that the deceased could have recovered damages for personal
injuries if his death had not resulted ...

shall be liable in damage.

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1996).
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Five years later, in Leccese v. McDonough,241 the father of a viable fetus
that died in utero as a result of medical malpractice brought a wrongful death
action against the doctors responsible.242 The court held that extending the
definition of the word "person" in the applicable statute to include a fetus not
born alive was best left to the legislature. 4 a However, just three years later, the
court came to the opposite conclusion in Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,244
holding that a viable fetus was a "person" within the meaning of the wrongful
death statute
and that a cause of action could be maintained for its death en ventre
245
sa mere.

The last case in this series is Thibert v. Milka.246 The father of a
nonviable, stillborn fetus brought a wrongful death action against the negligent
driver of a truck.247 The court held that "where a nonviable fetus is stillborn..
* the fetus could not have had a separate existence .... There is no separate
cause of action for its death. 248
In summary, Massachusetts allows a wrongful death action where the
infant is born alive, regardless of viability, and where the fetus is viable, but dies
in the womb. The courts of Massachusetts deny recovery, however, for the death
of a nonviable fetus en ventre sa mere.
Q.

Michigan
In Newman v. City of Detroit, an action was brought for the death of a

241279 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1972) (interpreting MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1986

& Supp. 1996)).
242Id. at 340.
243 Id. at 341.
244 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975) (interpreting MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (Law. Cop-op 1986

& Supp. 1996)).
245 Id. at 917.
246 646 N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. 1995) (interpreting MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (Law Co-op 1986

& Supp. 1996)).
247 Id. at 1025. The truck was carrying a backhoe that slid off the back of the truck and struck the

automobile driven by his wife who was sixteen weeks pregnant Id.
241

Id. at 1027.
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child who died after birth due to injuries he received in the womb.249 The
Supreme Court of Michigan held that an action for prenatal injuries
resulting in
2 50
death did not exist under the common law or under any statute.
The next significant case was Estate of Powers v. City of Troy, which
involved the stillbirth of a fetus in the sixth month of development.25 ' The
Supreme Court of Michigan held that there could be no cause of action for the
wrongful death of a viable infant that is not born alive, stating that the legislature
never intended the word "person" to include a fetal child. 2
In 1971, the Supreme Court of Michigan began to undo the precedent set
in Newman and Powers with the case of Womack v. Buchhorn.253 In that case,
an eight-year old boy brought an action for injuries he sustained in an automobile
accident during his fourth month of development in the womb. 254 The court
seized the opportunity to overrule Newman, stating, "[i]n the light of the present
state of science and the overwhelming weight of judicial authority, this Court now
overrules Newman. We hold that an action does lie at common law for
'
negligently inflicted prenatal injury."255
Just one month later, the court was given the opportunity to reconsider

249

250

274 N.W.2d 710 (Mich. 1937).
Id. at 711. The plaintiff brought suit under the Survival Act. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 14040

(1929).
211

252

156 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 1968).
Id. at 532-33. The "death act" is section 600.2922 of the Michigan Code, which provided that

"[w]henever the death of a Person or injuries resulting in death shall be caused by wrongful act.
. then and in every such case, the person who, or the corporation which would have been liable,
if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.2922 (1961) (current version at MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2922 (1988)). The current
version of the "death act" provides:
Whenever the death of a person or injuries resulting in death shall be caused by
wrongful act, neglect, or fault of another, and the act, neglect, or fault is such
as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain
an action and recover damages, the person who or the corporation which would
have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for
damages.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (1988).
23 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971).
254

Id. at 219.

255

Id. at 222.
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Powers. In O'Neill v. Morse,2 56 in which a wrongful death action was brought
for the stillbirth of a viable fetus, the facts were "indistinguishable" from those
in Powers.257 The court again took advantage of the opportunity to overrule
outdated case law and held that a cause of action would lie for the death of a
viable fetus in the womb.258
In Toth v. Goree, the Supreme Court of Michigan was asked to decide
whether wrongful death recovery could be had for a stillborn nonviable fetus. 25 9
In Toth, the administrator of the estate of a nonviable fetus that was stillborn as
a result of an automobile accident brought a wrongful death action.26 The court
drew the line of recovery at viability and held that a right of action did not exist
for the death of a nonviable fetus injured in the womb unless it was later born
alive.26 '
The last relevant case, Jarvis v. Providence Hospital, involved a novel set
of facts. 262 That case involved a wrongful death action for negligence which
occurred when the fetus was not yet viable, but which did not result in an injury
to the fetus until five months later when it was viable.263 The court held that the
fetus was viable when injured and, under O'Neill, recovery could be had
regardless of the fact that the conduct causing the injury occurred while the fetus

256

188 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1971) (interpreting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (1961)).

257

Id.

218

Id. at 787-88.

259 237 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. 1975) (interpreting MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
260

§ 600.2922 (1988)).

Id. at 298.

26' Id. at 300. In 1989, the Court of Appeals held that a cause of action could be maintained for

the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus that was killed in the womb. Fryover v. Forbes, 439
N.W.2d 284 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). However, that decision was reversed by the Supreme Court
of Michigan because it conflicted with Toth. Fryover v. Forbes, 446 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 1989).
26

Jarvis v. Providence Hosp., 444 N.W.2d 236 (Mich. 1989) (interpreting MICH. COMP. LAWS

ANN. § 600.2922 (1988)).
m Id. at 237. The mother cut herself on a vial that contained a bilirubin control substance when
the fetus was not viable. The hospital informed the mother that there was no risk of infection.
However, five months later, the mother was informed that she had contracted hepatitis and one week
later, the fetus was stillborn. Id.
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2 64
was not yet viable.
In summary, Michigan allows recovery when the fetus is born alive,
regardless of viability at the time of the injury, and when a viable fetus dies in
the womb. A wrongful death action on behalf of a nonviable fetus not born alive
has been rejected twice.

R.

Minnesota

Minnesota courts have considered the issue of prenatal torts only once,
2 65 Verkennes, decided in 1949,
in Verkennes v. Corniea.
involved an action on
behalf of a child that died just prior to delivery. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota in that case became the first state to allow a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a viable fetus in the womb.266 Verkennes began the gradual
move from the outdated view that a child in the womb is merely a part of the
mother to the modem view that a viable fetus leads an existence separate from
the mother.
S.

Mississippi

In Mississippi there is only one significant case pertaining to prenatal
torts. That case, Rainey v. Horn,267 involved the wrongful death of a viable fetus
en ventre sa mere due to misconduct on the part of the mother's treating
physician.26 8 The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that:
an unborn child, after it reaches the prenatal age of viability
when the destruction of the life of its mother does not necessarily
mean the end of its life also, and when, if separated from its
mother would be so far a matured human being that it would live
and grow mentally and physically, is a person; and if such child

264

Id. at 238.

265

38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).

26
See id. The action was based on section 573.02 of the Minnesota Code, which read, in part,
that "[w]hen death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any person or corporation, the
personal representative of the decedent may maintain an action, had he lived for an injury caused
by the same act or omission." MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (1943).

267

72 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1954).

268

Id. at 435.
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dies before birth as the result of the negligent act of another, an
action may be maintained for its death under the wrongful death
statute.269
T.

Montana

In Montana, there are two cases dealing with the issue of prenatal injuries.
The first, Kuhnke v. Fisher, was decided by the Supreme Court of Montana in
1984 and involved a wrongful death action on behalf of a viable fetus due to
alleged medical malpractice."' The court, in interpreting the Montana wrongful
death act, held that the definition
of "minor child" does not encompass an unborn
27
child whether viable or not. '

Three years after the Kuhnke decision, the legislature amended the
wrongful death statutes. 272 The first case to come before the court after the

269 Id. at 439-440. The Mississippi Code provides:

Whenever the death of any person shall be caused by any real, wrongful or
negligent act or omission, . . . as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled
the party injured or damages thereby to maintain an action and recover damages
in respect thereof ...the person or corporation, or both that would have been
liable if death had not ensued ... shall be liable for damages.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1972 & Supp. 1996) (corresponds to MISS. CODE ANN. § 1453
(1942)).
270 683 P.2d 916, 917 (Mont. 1984).
27,Id. at 919. The Montana Code provided, in part, that "[e]ither parent may maintain an action

for the injury or death of a minor child and a guardian for injury or death of a ward when such
injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another." MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-512
(1975).
27

At the time of the Kuhnke decision, there were two wrongful death statutes. Chapter 27, article

1, section 512 of the Montana Code created an action by a parent or guardian for the injury or death
of a child or ward. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-512 (1947). This was the statute in question in
Kuhnke. The other wrongful death statute was chapter 27, article 1, section 513, which provided,
"[w]hen the death of one person, not being a minor, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action.., against the person causing
the death ." MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-513 (1947) (current version at MONT CODE ANN. § 27-1-513
(1995)). In 1987, these statutes were changed so that all references to the death of a minor child
in section 512 were removed and all distinctions between minor and adult were replaced with the
word "person" in section 513, which now provides, "[w]hen injuries to and the death of one person
are caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, the personal representative of the decedent's
estate may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death." MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-513 (1995).
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amendments was Strzelczyk v. Jett,273 decided in 1994. In Jett, the mother of a
stillborn viable fetus brought a wrongful death action against the physician who
treated her during her pregnancy.274 The court decided to recognize a claim for
the wrongful death of a stillborn viable fetus based on the changes in the
wrongful death statutes and on Montana legislation that deemed "a child
conceived but not yet born" to be an existing person "so far as may be necessary
for its interests. 275
U.

Nevada

Nevada courts have addressed the issue of fetal wrongful death only once
in White v. Yup. 276 In that case, the mother of a viable fetus that had been killed
in an automobile accident brought a wrongful death action against the negligent
driver.2 77 The Supreme Court of Nevada first concluded that a child who suffers
prenatal injuries may maintain an action for those injuries after birth. 27" The court
then went on to hold that an action does exist for the stillbirth of a viable fetus
under the wrongful death act,2 79 stating that "[i]t is no less a loss to the survivors
where, as here, the child died before birth; and it is clear that the Legislature
273

870 P.2d 730 (Mont. 1994).

274

Id. at 73 1.

273

Id. at 732-33.

276 458 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969).
277

Id. at 617-18.

271 Id.

at 621. Specifically, the court stated that:
Without belaboring the point by an analysis of each of the cases in which
recovery was denied, it is sufficient to say that if, by the negligence or the
willful misconduct of someone, an unborn child must go through life crippled,
blind, subject to fits, or otherwise changed from a normal human being, one
must be impressed by the harshness of the result.

Id.
279 The Nevada Code provided:

Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the person injured to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof, then in every such case, the persons who.., would have been
liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages.
NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.080 (Michie 1957).
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intended that whatever loss there is should be compensated."2 "°
New Hampshire

V

The first time a New Hampshire court faced this issue was in 1957 in
Poliquin v. MacDonald.28 ' There, the mother of a stillborn viable fetus brought
a wrongful death action against the negligent driver who had caused the death of
the unborn child.2" 2 The court held that "a fetus having reached that period of
pre-natal maturity where it is capable of independent life apart from its mother
another's
is a person and if such child dies in the womb as the result of
283
behalf.,
its
in
maintained
be
may
recovery
negligence, an action for
The second case, Bennett v. Hymers, was decided in 1958.284 That case
involved an action on behalf of an infant who was injured while not yet viable
and who was subsequently born alive.28 The court held:
an infant born alive can maintain an action to recover for prenatal
injuries inflicted upon it by the tort of another even if it had not
reached the state of a viable fetus at the time of the injury. We
so decide because we see no logical reason for not extending the
it and are impressed by the
protection of the law of torts to
286
harshness of the opposite result.
The final significant case in New Hampshire involving prenatal injuries

280 White, 458 N.W.2d at 623.
281

135 A.2d 249 (N.H. 1957).

282

Id.

' Id. at 251. The wrongful death action was brought under section 556:7 of the New Hampshire
Code, which provides that "[i]f a right of action existed in favor of or against the deceased at the
time of his death, and survives, an action may be brought by or against the administrator." N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 556:7 (1955).
284 147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958).

285

Id. at 109.

286 Id. at

110.
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is Wallace v. Wallace.287 Wallace was a wrongful death action brought on behalf
of a nonviable fetus that was stillborn as the result of an automobile accident.288
The court concluded that drawing the line of demarcation for fetal wrongful death
recovery at the point of viability was appropriate.2 89 Accordingly, no cause of
action exists for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus that is not bom alive.2 90
W.

New Mexico

There are two New Mexico cases dealing with fetal wrongful death. The
first, Salazar v. St. Vincent Hospital, was decided by the Court of Appeals of
New Mexico in 19 8 0 .29' That case involved an action for the wrongful death of
a viable fetus en ventre sa mere resulting from alleged medical malpractice.2 92
The court concluded that a right of action for the stillbirth of a viable fetus
existed under the wrongful death statute.2 93

287

421 A.2d 134 (N.H. 1980).

288

Id. at 135.

289

Id. at 137.

290 Id. The court in this case made the much-quoted statement that:

to deny a nonviable fetus a cause of action is not to deny that life begins with
conception. It is simply a policy determination that the law will not extend civil
liability by giving a nonviable fetus a cause of action for negligence before it
becomes a person, in the real and usual sense of the word, by being born alive.
In other words, life may begin at conception but causes of action do not.
Id. at 136-37.
291 619 P.2d 826 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
292

Id.

293

Id. at 830. The New Mexico Code provides:

Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or
default of another, although such death shall have been caused under such
circumstances as would amount in law to a felony, and the act, or neglect, or
default, is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and
in every such case, the person who.., would have been liable, if death had not
ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 (Michie 1996).
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In the other New Mexico case, Miller v. Kirk,294 the mother of a
nonviable fetus that died in the womb after an automobile accident brought a
wrongful death action against the other driver. 95 The court held that no action
exists for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus en ventre sa mere. z96
X

North Carolina

North Carolina only recently decided a case on the issue of recovery for
prenatal injuries. In Gay v. Thompson, 97 the father of a viable fetus that was
tortiously killed in the womb brought a wrongful death action against his wife's
obstetrician. 93 The court, while condoning actions brought by infants born alive
who are impaired by prenatal injuries, refused to recognize a right of action when
the prenatal injury results in the death of the fetus in the womb.299
In 1968, the issue was revisited in Stetson v. Easterling."' Stetson
involved a wrongful death action brought by the father of an infant who sustained
30
injuries during birth which resulted in the infant's death several months later. '
The court acknowledged that the infant, had he lived, could have maintained an
action for the injuries he suffered during birth.30 2 However, the court refused to
allow recovery for the baby's wrongful death, despite the fact that he was born

294

905 P.2d 194 (N.M. 1995).

295

Id.

2916Id.

at 197.

297 146 S.E.2d 425 (N.C. 1966).
299 Id. at 425-26.
299 Id. at 429.

The North Carolina Code provides, in part:

When the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default of
another, such as would, if the injured person had lived, have entitled him to an
action for damages therefor, the person or corporation that would have been so
liable ... shall be liable to an action for damages.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984) (previously codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173(a) (1959)).
"

161 S.E.2d 531 (N.C. 1968) (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1959) (current version at

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984))).
301

id.

302

Id. at 534.
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alive.10 3 The court based its decision on the grounds that "plaintiff's allegations
are insufficient to show that [the infant's] estate has suffered pecuniary loss on
account of his death. 30 4
In 1975, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed Gay, but clouded the viability
of the Stetson decision. The case, Cardwell v. Welch, was an action to recover
for the wrongful death of a viable but stillborn fetus.3" 5 The court reasoned:
by speaking of the death of a 'person' and by creating a cause of
action to be brought by 'the executor, administrator or collector
of the decedent,' the Legislature was thinking solely in terms of
and intended to create a cause of action only for the wrongful
death of one who by live birth had attained a recognized
individual so as to have become a 'person' as that word is
commonly understood.30 6
This seems to conflict with the rule in Stetson that no recovery can be had for the
death of an infant who is born alive but who later dies from injuries suffered
prenatally.
Whatever confusion Caldwell may have caused was dispelled when
DiDonato v. Wortman30 7 was decided in 1987. In that case, the father of a viable
fetus that was stillborn as the result of negligent prenatal care brought a wrongful
death action against the negligent physician. 3 8 The court abandoned its earlier
decisions denying recovery for the wrongful death of a viable fetus en ventre sa
mere, and held that:
[t]he language of our wrongful death statute, its legislative
history, and recognition of the statute's broadly remedial

303

Id.

304 Id.

213 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. 1975) (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1973) (current version at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984))).
Id. at 383. This decision was re-affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the case of Yow v. Nance.

3

224 S.E.2d 292 (N.C. 1976).
307 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987) (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 28A-18-2 (1984) (previously

codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1981))).
300

id.
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objectives compel us to conclude that any uncertainty in the
meaning of the word 'person' should be resolved in favor of
permitting an action to recover for the destruction of a viable
fetus en ventre sa mere.30 9
In summary, North Carolina recognizes a cause of action for prenatal
injuries, for the death of an infant after sustaining injuries in the womb and then
being born alive, and for the wrongful death of a viable fetus en ventre sa mere.
The issue of recovery for the stillbirth of a nonviable fetus has not yet been
addressed.
Y

North Dakota

There is only one significant North Dakota case regarding the issue of
fetal wrongful death. Hopkins v. McBane"'0 involved an action brought by the
mother of a viable fetus that was stillborn, allegedly as the result of negligence
on behalf of her treating physician.3 ' The Supreme Court of North Dakota, after
concluding that a cause of action for prenatal injuries would be recognized for a
child who is born alive, 312 went on to authorize "a wrongful-death action
against
31 3
one whose tortious conduct causes the death of a viable unborn child." '
Z.

Ohio

Ohio courts have adjudicated several cases within the realm of prenatal
injuries and fetal wrongful death. The first, Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit,
involved an infant's right to recover for personal injuries inflicted while in the

309

Id. at 493.

310 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984).
311

Id. at 863.

312

Id. at 864.

311 Id.

at 865. The North Dakota Code provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or
default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would have entitled the party
injured, if death had not ensued, to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who ... would have
been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages.
N.D. CENT.CODE § 32-21-01 (1996).
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womb. 1 4 The Supreme Court of Ohio determined that:
If a right of action be denied to the child it will be compelled,
without any fault on its part, to go through life carrying the seal
of another's fault and bearing a very heavy burden of infirmity
and inconvenience without any compensation therefor. To my
mind it is but natural justice that a child, if born alive and viable,
should be allowed to maintain an action in the courts for injuries
wrongfully committed on its person while in the womb of its
mother.1 5
The next case, Jasinsky v. Potts, 316 involved a wrongful death action
brought by the father of an infant who was injured during his eighth month of
prenatal development, was born alive, and then died three months later.3" 7 The
court held that recovery can be had for the death of a viable fetus injured en
ventre sa mere and subsequently born alive.3" 8
In 1959, Stidam v. Ashmore was decided.31 9 Stidam was a wrongful death
action on behalf of a viable fetus that was negligently killed in the womb.32 0 The
Court of Appeals concluded that when a viable fetus is stillborn as a result of a
tortfeasor's negligence, the fetus' administrator may maintain a wrongful death

314 87 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949).
315 Id. at 339 (quoting Montreal Tramways v. LeVeille, 4 D.L.R. 337 (Can. 1933)).

Currently, the

Ohio Code provides, in pertinent part:
When the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default which
would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages
if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not
ensued ... shall be liable to an action for damages.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.10 (Baldwin 1994).
316 92 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio 1950) (interpreting OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 10509-166 (Baldwin 1942)

(current version at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125-01 (Baldwin 1994))).
317

Id.

311

Id. at 812.

319

167 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio 1959).

320

Id. at 107.
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32
action on its behalf.
The final relevant Ohio case, Egan v. Smith,322 was decided in 1993.
That case, involved the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus in the womb.323 The
court refused to push the line of demarcation back from viability to conception,
thereby rejecting a cause of action for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus en
ventre sa mere.324

AA.

Oklahoma

Oklahoma first addressed the issue of recovery for prenatal injuries and
fetal wrongful death in Howell v. Rushing.325 In Howell, the parents of a fetus
3 26
that was tortiously killed in utero brought a wrongful death action for their loss.
The court ruled that no cause of action existed for the wrongful death of a fetus
en ventre sa mere.327 When the Supreme Court was presented with this issue
again in 1967, it chose not to abandon Howell.328

321 Id. The

court stated:

We are unable to reconcile the two propositions, that if the death occurred after
birth there is a cause of action, but that if it occurred before birth there is none.
Or, to adapt the words of the Supreme Court... it would be absurd if recovery
could be had for such injuries, unless those injuries were so severe as to cause
death before birth. Such a distinction could lead to bizarre results.
Id. This decision was validated in Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985).
322 622 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio 1993).
323

Id. at 1192.

324

Id. at 1193-94.

32 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953).
326

327

Id.
Id. The Oklahoma Code provides, in part:

When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the
personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against
the latter . . . if the former might have maintained an action had he lived,
against the latter ... for an injury for the same act or omission.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West 1981).
328

See Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967).
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In 1976, the court was given another opportunity to reconsider Howell.329
In that case, the court, recognizing the right of an infant to bring an action for
injuries received while in the womb, decided that "[i]t is time this jurisdiction
recognizes the right of a viable unborn child to maintain a cause of action for
injury and wrongful death. Howell ...and Padillow ...are expressly overruled
33
as to that issue.""
33
The final Oklahoma case of note is Guyer v. Hugo Publishing Co.
That case involved a wrongful death action on behalf of a nonviable fetus that
was stillborn as a result of an automobile accident.332 The Court of Appeals held
that a wrongful death action does not exist for the death of a nonviable fetus en
ventre sa mere.333
BB.

Oregon

In Oregon, only two cases have been decided on the issue of recovery for
prenatal injures. The first, Mallison v. Pomeroy,334 involved an infant's action for
prenatal injuries sustained during viability.335 The court held that when a viable
fetus is tortiously injured in the womb, it may maintain an action for those
injuries following birth.336
The second and most recent Oregon case regarding prenatal injuries was
Libbee v. Permanente Clinic. 337 In Libbee, the mother of a full-term fetus that

329 Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976).
330

id.

33,

830 P.2d 1393 (Okla. 1992).

332

Id.

333Id.at 1395.
114

291 P.2d 225 (Or. 1955).

333 id.

336

Id. at 226.

317

518 P.2d 636 (Or. 1973).
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died in the womb sought wrongful death damages from the hospital responsible. 8
The court, concluded that a viable fetus can be the object of wrongful death
recovery, even if not born alive.33 9
CC.

Pennsylvania

In Pennsylvania, there is considerable case law regarding the issue of
recovery for prenatal injuries. The first significant case was Sinkler v. Kneale,340
in which an infant sought damages for injuries she received during her first month
of fetal development that caused her to be born Mongoloid.34' The court held that
a cause of action existed for prenatal injuries inflicted on an unborn child,
regardless of whether or not the fetus was viable at the time of the injury.342
Four years later, in Carrol v. Skloff,343 the court was asked to decide
whether recovery for wrongful death could be had for the death of a stillborn
fetus.344 The court held that the legislature never intended to create a cause of

338 Id. at 636-37. The Oregon Code currently provides, in pertinent part:

When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of
another, the personal representative of the decedent... may maintain an action
against the wrongdoer, if the decedent might have maintained an action, had the
decedent lived, against the wrongdoer for injury dome by the same act or
omission.
OR. REv. STAT. § 30.020 (1995).
"' Libbee, 518 P.2d at 640.
340 164 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1960).

141Id. at 94.
342

Id. at 95-96.

14'202 A.2d 9 (Pa. 1964) (interpreting 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 320.601 (1937) (current
version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (1982 & Supp. 1996))).
344The Pennsylvania Code currently provides, in part:
An action may be brought, under procedures prescribed by general
rules, to recover damages for the death of an individual caused by the
wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another
if no recovery for the same damages claimed in the wrongful death
action was obtained by the injured individual during his lifetime.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301(a) (1982 & Supp. 1996).
The Pennsylvania Code also provides that "[a]ll causes of action or proceedings, real or personal,
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action for an unborn fetus and that the overwhelming authority supported denial
of recovery for the death of a fetus never born alive.345
Carrol remained controlling until 1985 when the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decided Amadio v. Levin.346 In Amadio, the parents of a stillborn
but otherwise viable fetus brought a wrongful death action against negligent
physicians. 347 The court concluded that, "the time has arrived for us to join our
twenty-eight sister states and the District of Columbia and recognize that survival
and wrongful death actions lie by the estates of stillborn children for fatal injuries
348
they received while viable children en ventre sa mere.,
The next pertinent Pennsylvania case was decided by a superior court of
Pennsylvania in 1989. 3' 9 That case was a wrongful death and survival action on
behalf of triplet nonviable fetuses who were injured in the womb, born alive, and
died within twenty-four hours of birth. 35" The court held that, "we cannot decide
that fetuses born prior to attaining viability should now be accorded the same

shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or the death of one or more joint
plaintiffs or defendants." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302 (1982).
Carrol, 202 A.2d at 11. Although, the fetus in this case was not viable, the court does not
engage in a discussion of viability; in fact, the issue of viability is completely ignored. However,
two years later, the issue of viability was addressed in Marko v. PhiladelphiaTransportationCo.,
which involved the stillbirth of a viable fetus. 216 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1966). The plaintiff tried to
distinguish the case from Carrolon the grounds that Carrolinvolved a nonviable fetus, while Marko
involved a viable one. Id. at 503. However, the court stated that, "the [plaintiffs contention is
without merit," and that "viability was incidental and not controlling." Id. The court when on to
hold that no cause of action exists for the death of a viable fetus en ventre sa mere. Id. This
holding was reaffirmed in Scott v. Kopp. 431 A.2d 959 (Pa. 1981).
341

14

147

501 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985) (interpreting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (1982 & Supp. 1996)).
Id. at 1085-86.

Id. at 1086-87. A survival action refers to an action for personal injuries inflicted on the
decedent which, rather than being extinguished on the decedent's death, survives the decedent and
which can then be brought by the decedent's personal representative. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 8, at 1446. A wrongful death action, on the other hand, is not an action on behalf of
the decedent, but an action that accrues to the decedent's beneficiaries by virtue of the death of the
decedent. Id. at 1612.
14

149

567 A.2d 1095 (Pa. 1989).

"s Id. at 1096.
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rights that children who have attained viability have been accorded." '' Thus, the
court refused to recognize a cause of action for the death of a fetus injured in the
womb and born alive prior to viability.3 52
The final significant case decided in Pennsylvania involving fetal
wrongful death is Coveleski v. Bubnis.353 In that case, the mother of a nonviable
fetus that died in the womb as a result of an automobile accident brought a
wrongful death and survival action." 4 The court held that drawing the line for
recovery at the point of viability was proper and that no right of action existed
for the death of a fetus in the womb prior to that point.355
In summary, Pennsylvania recognizes a cause of action for prenatal
injuries when the child is bom alive regardless of when the injuries were inflicted,
for the death of an infant injured while viable and subsequently born alive, and
for the stillbirth of a viable fetus. Pennsylvania courts have denied recovery for
the death of a fetus that was injured while not viable and then born alive, and for
the death of a nonviable fetus en ventre sa mere.
DD.

Rhode Island

The first time Rhode Island courts ruled on the issue was in 1901 in
Gorman v. Budlong" 6 Gorman involved an action to recover damages for
prenatal injuries inflicted on a fetus that was subsequently born alive. The court
adopted the Dietrich357 rule that a negligence action may not be maintained on
behalf of a fetus, nor may the next-of-kin maintain a wrongful death action for
its prenatal injuries, regardless of the viability of the fetus, or whether the fetus
358
was bom alive.

31,

Id. at 1098.

352

Id.

3'3 571 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1990)
314

(interpreting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (1982 & Supp. 1996)).

Id. at 434.

' Id. at 436. This decision was affirmed in McCaskill v. PhiladelphiaHousing Authority. 615
A.2d 382 (Pa. 1992).
356 49 A. 704 (R.I. 1901).

3" Dietrich v. Inhabitantsof Northhampton, 52 Am.R. 242 (1844).
38

Id. at 17.
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This remained the law in Rhode Island for sixty-five years, until Sylvia
v. Gobeille.359 That case, which involved an action brought by an infant who was
born with physical defects as a result of a physician's negligence, was a direct
challenge to Gorman.36" The court seized the opportunity to overrule Gorman
and held that "a child born alive has a right of action in tort against a negligent
wrongdoer for prenatal injuries. 36'
Ten years later, the court was faced with a wrongful death action for the
stillbirth of a viable fetus. 362 The court held that recovery was available under the
wrongful death statute for the death of a viable fetus en ventre sa mere.363
However, the court also stated:
[i]n Sylvia, we were unable logically to conclude that a claim for
injury inflicted prior to viability is any less meritourious than one
sustained after. Similarly, in the present instance, logic does not
permit the insistence on viability as the line of demarcation
between those for whom an action will lie and those who are
without rights under the statute.364
The court went on to say that "as our holding in this case indicates, the decedent,
whether viable or nonviable, was a 'person' within the meaning of the Wrongful

319 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966).
360

Id.

36' Id. at 224. The court also stated, "[i]n our judgment there is no sound reason for drawing a line

at the precise moment of the fetal development when the child attains the capability of an
independent existence, and we reject viability as a decisive criterion." Id. at 223. This rejection
of the viability standard, although unimportant in the Sylvia decision, became increasingly
significant in later cases.
Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976). The Rhode Island Code provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect,
or default of another, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would, if death
had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof, the person who ... would have been liable if death
had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1 (1985).
362

363

Presley, 365 A.2d at 754.

364

Id.
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Death Act."3 65 The rejection of the viability standard led to many questions about
the scope of this case. Specifically, there was speculation as to whether Rhode
Island now recognized a cause of action for the wrongful death of a nonviable
fetus en ventre sa mere. A close reading of the opinion indicates, that, in fact,
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island intended to create a cause of action for the
death of an unborn child at any moment after conception.
However, in 1991, the question of whether recovery for a stillborn,
nonviable fetus could be had was answered in the negative in Miccolis v. Amica
Mutual Insurance Co.366 In Miccolis, the court declined to recognize a right of
action for the death of a nonviable fetus in the womb, rejecting any indications
to the contrary contained within earlier opinions. 67 Specifically, the court stated:
we note that the overwhelming majority view in this country is
that a nonviable fetus has no right to bring an action for wrongful
death. The language of the plurality opinion of Presley to the
contrary is merely dictum and has no precedential value in
respect to the instant case. We do not believe that the
Legislature intended a nonviable fetus to be defined as a 'person'
within the meaning of the wrongful-death statute. 68
In summary, Rhode Island recognizes a cause of action for prenatal
injuries, regardless of viability at the time of the injury, if the fetus is
subsequently born alive and for the death of a viable fetus in the womb.
However, wrongful death recovery for a nonviable fetus that is not born alive has
been denied.
EE.

South Carolina

The courts of South Carolina first contemplated the issue of prenatal
injuries in 1958. That case, West v. McCoy,369 was a wrongful death action for
the death of a fetus in its fifth month of prenatal development due to an

365

Id.

366

587 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1991).

367

Id. at 71.

368

Id.

369

105 S.E.2d 88 (S.C. 1958).
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automobile accident. 37" The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that a
child is not regarded as a person until it is born alive and ruled that no action
existed under the wrongful death statute for the stillbirth of an unborn child.37 1
Two years later, the court was presented with another case involving
prenatal injuries. That case, Hall v. Murphy,372 involved a negligence action on
behalf of an infant that was injured while viable in the womb, born alive and died
four hours later.37 3 The court held that, "a foetus having reached that period of
prenatal maturity where it is capable of independent life apart from its mother is
a person and if such a child is injured, it may after birth maintain an action for
such injuries.,, 374 Therefore, the court concluded, if the child died, the right of
action would survive to its personal representative.375
In 1964, two cases dealing with fetal wrongful death were decided within
one month of each other. The first, Todd v. Sandridge Construction Co., 37 6 was
a federal case in which the father of a viable fetus that was stillborn as the result
of an automobile accident brought a cause of action for its wrongful death.377
The court distinguished this case from West on the grounds that West involved the
death of a fetus prior to viability, while the child in this case was viable at the

370

Id. at 88.

371 Id. at 90. The South Carolina Code provided (and currently provides), in pertinent part:

Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or
default of another and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had
not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof, the person who would have been liable, if death had
not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1951 (Law. Co-op. 1952) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-10
(Law. Co-op. 1993)).
372

113 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 1960) (interpreting S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1951 (Law. Co-op. 1952)

(current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-10 (Law. Co-op. 1993))).
373 Id. at 791.
374

Id. at 793.

375

Id.

376

341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964) (interpreting S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1951 (Law. Co-op. 1952)

(current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-10 (Law. Co-op. 1993))).
377

Id. at 76.
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time of its death.3 7' Due to the obvious injustice that would result in allowing
recovery where the child is born alive, but denying recovery in the more severe
instance where the child dies prior to birth, the court held that recovery would be
allowed where a viable fetus is killed in the womb.37 9
The other case, decided one month after Todd, was a state case involving
the same question of law.38 In that case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
came to the same conclusion as the United States Court of Appeals, holding that
a wrongful death action would lie for the death of a viable infant, tortiously killed
" '
in the womb.38
FF.

Vermont

There is only one significant Vermont case in the area of fetal wrongful
death. That case, Vaillancourtv. Medical Center Hospital of Vermont, Inc.,382
involved a wrongful death action brought on behalf of a viable, but stillborn,
fetus.383 The court held that a wrongful death action can be maintained for the
death of a viable fetus in the womb.384
GG.

Washington
The issue of recovery for prenatal injuries was first addressed by the

378

Id.

371

Id. at 77-78.

3' Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964) (interpreting S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1951 (Law.

Co-op. 1962) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-10 (Law. Co-op. 1993))).
311Id. at 45.
382 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980).
313 Id. at 93. The Vermont Code currently provides:

When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of
a person or corporation, and the act, neglect or default is such as would have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof, if death had not ensued, the person or corporation liable to such action
shall be liable to an action for damages.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1491 (1989).
384 Vaillancourt, 425 A.2d at 94.
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Supreme Court of Washington in Seattle FirstNational Bank v. Rankin.385 In that
case, a child brought an action to recover for injuries sustained prior to birth that
resulted in the child being born with a form of cerebral palsy.38 6 The court took
the position in "accord with the clear trend of recent cases" and held that the
child could recover for her prenatal injuries.387
In 1975, the Supreme Court of Washington faced the question of whether
the parents of a viable fetus that was negligently killed in the womb could recover
for its wrongful death. 388 The court in Moen v. Hanson,89 concluded that a cause
of action could be maintained for the wrongful death of a viable fetus en ventre
sa mere because "[d]enial of recovery to an unborn child tortiously killed, on the
arbitrary grounds that the child did not survive the tort long enough to be born
alive, is eminently illogical.""39 In 1994, the court decided that a cause of action
could also be maintained under the survival statute in the same circumstances.39'
HH.

Wisconsin

The first important Wisconsin case, Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Railway
& Light Co., 392 involved an infant's action for prenatal injuries received before

3" 367 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1962).
386

Id. at 837.

3K7Id. at 838.
31 Moen v. Hanson, 537 P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975). The Washington Code provides, in part, that

"[t]he mother or father or both may maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a minor
child, or a child on whom either, or both, are dependent for support." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
4.24.010 (West 1988).
389 537 P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975).
390

Id. at 268.

391Cavazos v. Franklin, 867 P.2d 674 (Wash. 1994). The Washington Code provides in pertinent

part that "[a]ll causes of action by a person or persons against another person or persons shall
survive to the personal representatives of the former and against the personal representatives of the
latter, whether such actions arise on contract or otherwise." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.20.046
(1988 & Supp. 1996).
392

159 N.W. 916 (Wis. 1916).
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it was viable in the womb.393 The court held that an infant could not recover for
prenatal injuries it sustained while not yet viable because a nonviable fetus is
incapable of separate existence from its mother.394
In Puhl v. Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin was again presented with the question of whether an infant that was
injured while nonviable in the womb could maintain an action for those injuries
after birth.39 The court concluded that there was insufficient proof of causation
to sustain an award of damages and that there was no need to decide the bigger
issue regarding prenatal injuries.396 However, the court, noting that the issue was
an important one took the opportunity to "point out the present status of the
law."'3 97 The court overruled Lipps, rejected the viability standard, and stated that
the child is "no more a part of its mother before it becomes viable than it is after
viability."3 98 This holding was limited to cases in which a child born alive was
seeking to recover for prenatal injuries.
The last relevant case is Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. 399 That case involved a wrongful death action brought by the
parents of a viable fetus that was stillborn as the result of an automobile
accident.40 0 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a stillborn viable fetus
can be the object of a wrongful death action.4"'

393 Id.

394

Id. at 917.

391

99 N.W.2d 163 (Wis. 1959).

396

Id. at 169.

397

Id.

391

Id. at 170.

399 148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967).
400 Id. at 108. The Wisconsin Code provides:

Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or
default and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages ...
then... the person who would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall
be liable to an action for damages.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.03 (West 1983).
401 Kwaterski, 148 N.W.2d at 112.
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IV. STATES THAT ALLOW RECOVERY FOR THE
DEATH OF A NONVIABLE FETUS NOT BORN ALIVE

A.

Georgia

The first case to address the issue in Georgia was Tucker v. Carmichael
& Sons." 2 That case was an action on behalf of an infant to recover damages for
prenatal injuries allegedly caused by the defendant's negligent operation of a
vehicle." 3 The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the infant could maintain an
action for prenatal injuries, stating:
life begins when the child is able to stir in the mother's womb.
It can have a legacy, can own an estate, and a guardian can be
assigned to it.... It would therefore be illogical, unrealistic, and
unjust -- both to the child and to society -- for the law to
withhold its processes necessary for the protection of the person
of an unborn child, while, at the same time, making such
processes available for the purpose of protecting its property.40 4
The most important Georgia case in this area of the law is undoubtedly
Porter v. Lassiter.40 5 That case involved a wrongful death action by a mother
whose nonviable unborn child was stillborn as a result of an automobile
accident. 40 6 The Court of Appeals determined that:
a suit may be maintained by a mother for the loss of a child that
was 'quick' in her womb at the time of the [injury] . . . . The
court does not believe it necessary for the child to be 'viable'
provided that it was 'quick,' that is able to move in its mother's
womb. 0 7

402

65 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. 1951).

403

Id. at 909-10.

404

Id. at 910-11.

40'

87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955).

406

Id. at 101.

407

Id. at 103.
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As a result of the Porter decision, Georgia became the first state to allow
wrongful death recovery for the death of an unborn fetus that may not be viable
at the time of the tortious act." 8
The next year, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided Hornbuckle v.
PlantationPipe Line Co.4" 9 In Hornbuckle, an action was brought on behalf of
a child who sustained prenatal injuries in a car accident while not yet quick in the
womb.410 The accident resulted in the child being physically deformed"1 The
court held that "if a child is born after a tortious injury sustained at any period
after conception, he has a cause of action."4 2
B.

Missouri

Missouri courts have been very active in the area of prenatal torts. In
Buel v. United Railway Co., the court held that an unborn child was a not a
separate entity from its mother and therefore could not maintain an action for
injuries received while in the womb.4" 3
That remained the law in Missouri for forty years until the Supreme Court

4" Currently, three other states allow recovery for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus. See
also Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996); Conner v. Monkem Co., 898
S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995); Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
409 93 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1956).
410

Id. at 728.

411

Id. The child was born with a deformed right foot, right ankle, and right leg. Id.

412 Id. There are two other notable cases in Georgia that relates to this issue of fetal wrongful

death. The first is GulfLfe Insurance Co. v. Brown. 351 S.E.2d 267 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). In that
case, the Court of Appeals was asked to grant the insurance company summary judgment based on
their contention that a stillborn child was not a "person" so as to be covered under the insurance
policy. Id. The court refused to decide whether the stillborn child was a "person" for purposes of
the policy, saying that it was a question of fact for the jury, not a question of law. Id.
The second case, McAuley v. Wills, was an action for the wrongful death of a fetus that
died as a result of injuries to the mother prior to conception. 303 S.E.2d 258 (Ga. 1983). The
action was barred by the statute of limitations, but on the issue of pre-conception injuries the court
said that "to the extent that the trial court ruled that a person owes no duty of care toward an
unconceived child, we must disagree. Cases cited [earlier] show that, at least in some situations,
a person should be under a duty of care toward an unconceived child." Id. at 260.
413

154 S.W. 71, 72 (Mo. 1913).
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of Missouri decided Steggall v. Morris.4 1 4 Steggall also involved the death of a
child shortly after birth as a result of injuries sustained while viable in the
womb.41 5 The court overruled Buel, stating that "it is but natural justice that a
child born alive and viable, should be allowed to maintain an action in the Courts
for injuries wrongfully committed upon its person while in the womb of its
mother," and that the tort-feasor should also be liable if those injuries cause
death.41 6
The next significant Missouri case that dealt with prenatal injuries was
State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders.!17 In that case, a couple brought a wrongful
death action for the stillbirth of their viable fetus following an automobile
accident."' 8 The court held that "[i]t is our view that a fetus is not a 'person'
within the meaning of our wrongful death statute until there has been a live
birth.",4 9
However, this decision was fairly short-lived. In 1983, the Supreme
Court of Missouri reversed Hardin in O'Grady v. Brown."2 0 In O'Grady the
parents of a viable fetus, that was stillborn in the ninth month of gestation,
brought a wrongful death action against the negligent doctor and hospital. 42' The
court held that the term "person" as used in section 537.080 of the Missouri Code
includes the human fetus en ventre sa mere and allowed an action for the stillbirth

4,4 258

S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1953) (interpreting Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (Vernon 1939) (current
version at MO. ANN. STAT. § 536.080 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1996))).

411 Id.

at 538.

416

Id. at 581 (quoting Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337, loc. cit. 345 (1933)).

417

538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976) (interpreting Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (Vernon 1967)).

4l8

Id. at 337.

419 Id.

at 338.

420

654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983).

421

Id. at 906. The Missouri Code provides, in part:

Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct, occurrence,
transaction, or circumstance which, if death had not ensued, would have entitled
such person to recover damages in respect thereof, the person who, or the
corporation which, would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be
liable in an action for damages.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.080 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1996).
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of a viable fetus.422
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided Rambo v. Lawson.423
Rambo involved a wrongful death action brought on behalf of a nonviable fetus
that died in the womb as the result of an automobile accident.4 24 The court
declined to extend the line of demarcation for recovery beyond the point of
viability, thus rejecting recovery for the death of a nonviable fetus in the womb.425
In Connor v. Monkem Co., 42 6 which involved the death of a nonviable
fetus in the fourth month of fetal development, the court, in another quick
reversal, reversed Rambo and allowed recovery.427 The court based its decision
on section 1.205 of the Missouri Code, which was enacted by the legislature in
1988, but which the court found unpersuasive five years earlier in Rambo. 42' That
422

O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910.

423 799 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1990).
424

Id.

425

Id. at 63. In 1986, the Missouri legislature passed a statute which reads:

1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health and well-being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the life,
health, and well-being of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and
construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of
development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other
persons, citizens, and residents of this state ....
3. As used in this section, the term "unborn children" or "unborn child" shall
include all unborn child or children or the offspring of human beings from the
moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological development.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action
against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly
care for herself or by failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (Supp. 1996).
However, the court quickly dismissed this statute, stating, "[w]e find no indication in the text that
this bill was designed to amend the wrongful death statutes, which the legislature could easily have
done had such been its intention." Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 64.
426 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995).
427

Id. at 92.

428

id.
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section expresses the intention of the Missouri legislature that the courts read all
Missouri statutes in accord with the interpretation that life begins at conception
and that parents of unborn children have protectable interests in that child's life.429
The court stated that "we cannot avoid the conclusion that the legislature intended
the courts to interpret 'person' within the wrongful death statute to allow a natural
parent to state a claim for the wrongful death of his or her unborn child, even
prior to viability."'"0
C.

South Dakota

In South Dakota there exists a situation unlike any other jurisdiction in
the United States. Prior to 1984, that state's wrongful death statute was very
similar to those of many other states.43' However, in 1984 the statute was
amended to include a provision regarding the wrongful death of unborn
children.432 The amendment provided that unborn children would be expressly
included in the statute, with no mention of a viability or live birth standard.433

429

Id.

o Id. The court distinguished this case from Rambo by noting that the incident that gave rise to
the lawsuit in Rambo occurred prior to the effective date of the statute and therefore it "is not to
be followed for incidents arising subsequent to the effective date of that section." Connor v.
Monkem Company, Inc., 898 S.W.2d at 93.
43'The South Dakota wrongful death statute provided:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or
default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereto, if death
had not ensued, then and in every such case, the ... person who, would have
been liable, if death had not ensued . . . shall be liable, to an action for
damages.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 21-5-1 (1947) (current version at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 12-5-1
(1987)).
432 The South Dakota wrongful death statute now provides, in pertinent part:

Whenever the death or injury of a person, including an unborn child, shall be
caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is
such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages with respect thereto, if death had not ensued, then and in every such
case,... the person who, would have been liable, if death had not ensued..
•shall be liable, to an action for damages.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-5-1 (1987).
433 Id.
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In 1986, the Supreme Court of South Dakota was asked to interpret the
pre-amendment statute with regard to a viable, stillborn fetus.434 The court held
that, due to the "clear, overwhelming and growing majority of jurisdictions"
permitting actions in such cases, a cause of action for the death of a viable,
unborn fetus did exist under the wrongful death statute, even prior to the 1984
amendment.43 5
In 1996, the Supreme Court of South Dakota decided Wiersma v. Maple
Leaf Farms,the first case arising under the amended wrongful death statute.436
In that case, the parents of a fetus that was killed in its seventh week of prenatal
development brought a cause of action for its wrongful death. 437 The court held
that the words "including an unborn child" 438 referred to a fetus in all stages of
prenatal development, not just to a viable fetus or one later born alive.439
Accordingly, an action can be maintained for the death of a nonviable fetus en
ventre sa mere.440
West Virginia

D.

There are several cases in West Virginia dealing with fetal wrongful
death. The first time the issue was addressed was in 1969 in Panagopoulous v.

434

Farley v. Mount Marty Hosp. Ass'n., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1986).

435 Id.

at 44. Interestingly, the defendants tried to use the amendment to their advantage, arguing
that the amendment evidenced the legislature's intent to not create a cause of action for the
wrongful death of an unborn child until 1984. Id. However, this argument was rejected by the
court.
436

543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996).

431Id.

at 789.

431S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN.

§ 21-5-1 (1987).

439

Wiersma, 543 N.W.2d at 790.

440

Id. at 791.

With this decision, South Dakota became only the fourth state to recognize a

wrongful death action for the death of a fetus in the womb prior to viability. See also Porter v.
Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. 1955) (permitting recovery if the child is "quick" in the womb);
Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) (allowing a wrongful death action for a
stillborn fetus prior to viability); Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (recognizing a right of action for
the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus en ventre sa mere).
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Martin."' In that case, the mother of a stillborn, viable fetus brought an action
against the driver of a truck and his employer for the wrongful death of her
unborn child resulting from an automobile accident.442 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia first addressed the issue of
whether an action could be maintained by the infant for prenatal injuries had he
survived.44 3 On that issue, the court determined that "if the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals were to decide a case similar to the present case it
would uphold a cause of action for a child seeking to recover damages for
injuries suffered while in its mother's womb."" 4 The court then went on to
conclude that a cause of action for the death of a viable fetus in the womb should
also be permitted due to the medical recognition that a viable fetus is an
individual capable of a separate existence from its mother.445
Two years later, in 1971, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
addressed this same issue.446 That case stemmed from an automobile accident in
which the plaintiff's viable fetus was killed in the womb.447 The court held that
"an action may be maintained by the personal representative of a viable unborn
child for the wrongful death of such child caused by injuries sustained by it while
'
in the womb of its mother resulting from the negligence of the defendant."448
Then, in 1995, the landmark case of Farley v. Sartin was decided by the

44'

295 F.Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969).

Id. at 221-22. The West Virginia Code provides, in part:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not
ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages
in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or the
corporation which, would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be
liable to an action for damages.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1994).

442

441

Panagopoulous,295 F. Supp. at 223.

444

Id. at 225.

445

Id.

446

Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971).

447

Id. at 429.

441

Id. at 436.
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Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.449 In that case, the father of
nonviable fetus that was stillborn as the result of an automobile accident brought
a wrongful death action against the other driver and his employer.45 The court
held that drawing the line for wrongful death recovery at the point of viability is
inappropriate and without merit and that a nonviable fetus is a "person" in the
context of the wrongful death statute,45 even when not born alive.452 Accordingly,
the personal representative of a nonviable fetus tortiously killed in the womb can
maintain a wrongful death action against the tortfeasor and recover damages.453
With this decision, West Virginia became only the third state (of four) to allow
recovery for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus en ventre sa mere.454
V. STATES WITH No CASE LAW

Wyoming

A.

As of the date of this article, no cases had been decided in Wyoming
regarding the issue of prenatal injuries and fetal wrongful death.
VI. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, there are three main views regarding recovery for fetal

"4

466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).

450 Id.

411

W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1994).

452

Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 532. The court stated:

In jurisdictions where the viability standard is controlling, the tortfeasor remains
unaccountable for the full extent of the injuries inflicted by his or her wrongful
conduct. In our judgment, justice is denied when a tortfeasor is permitted to
walk away with impunity because of the happenstance that the unborn child has
not yet reached viability at the time of death. The societal and parental loss is
egregious regardless of the state of fetal development. Our concern reflects the
fundamental value determination of our society that life--old, young, and
prospective-should not be wrongfully taken away.
Id. at 533.
411

Id. at 534.

also Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. 1955); Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89
(Mo. 1995); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996).
4m4 See
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wrongful death. The minority view, still adhered to in twelve states, holds that
there must be a live birth before recovery can be had for death of the infant due
to injuries sustained while in the womb. The majority view, which thirty-four
states have adopted, allows recovery for the death of a viable fetus in the womb.
These states do not require that the fetus be born alive in order for the personal
representative to recover for its death due to injuries sustained in the womb.
However, these states do limit recovery to fetuses which have obtained viability.
The last category of states represent a new trend in this area of the law. These
four states of Georgia, Missouri, South Dakota, and West Virginia allow recovery
for the death of a fetus in the womb at any point after conception.4 55 These states
do not require a live birth for recovery, nor do they require that the fetus have
reached the point of viability. Although a number of other states have rejected
this idea, it may represent the future in this area of the law.
Jill D. Washburn Helbling

Georgia requires that the fetus be "quick in the womb," which may occur before or after
viability.

'55

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss2/10

68

Washburn Helbling: To Recover Or Not to Recover: A State by State Survey of Fetal Wr
1996]

STATE BY STATE SURVEY

STATES THAT REQUIRE A
LIVE BIRTH FOR
RECOVERY

STATES THAT ALLOW
RECOVERY FOR THE
DEATH OF A VIABLE
FETUS NOT BORN ALIVE

STATES THAT ALLOW
RECOVERY FOR DEATH
OF A NONVIABLE FETUS
NOT BORN ALIVE

Arkansas*

Alabama**

Georgia** (quick in the
womb)

California

Alaska*

Missouri**

Florida

Arizona

South Dakota**

Iowa

Colorado

West Virginia**

Maine

Connecticut**

Nebraska

Delaware

New Jersey

District of Columbia

New York

Hawaii*

Tennessee

Idaho

Texas

Illinois**

Utah

Indiana

Virginia**

Kansas

Kentucky
Louisiana"*
Maryland*"
Massachusetts**
Michigan**
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
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Nevada
New Hampshire**
New Mexico
North Carolina**
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island**
South Carolina
Vermont
Washington**
Wisconsin
Wyoming has no case law addressing this issue.
* indicates that the issue has not been addressed by a state court but that a federal
court has ruled in this manner.
** indicates that the state allows recovery for the death of an infant born alive
resulting from injuries sustained prior to viability.
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